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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 0 STATE OF IDAHO 
GARY WAYNE MALLORY II, 














STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondents. 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce 
BEFORE THE HO.NORABLE JAY P. GASKILL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Counsel for Appellant 
Sara B. Thoi:nas 
SAPD 
Counsel for Respondent 




Time: 03:16 PM 
P~ge 1 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000763 Current Judge:.Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: DEANNA 














































New Case Filed-'Post .conviction Relief Carl B. Kerrick 
Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings c.arl B. Kerrick 
Paid by: gary maUory Receipt number: 0006386 
· Dated: 4/12/2013 . Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: 
Mallory, Gary Wayne II (plaintiff) 
Subject: Mallory, Gary Wayne II Attorney 
Retained Richard M Cuddihy .. 
· Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Carl B. Kerrick 
Partial Payment 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Carl B. Kerrick 
Counsel 
Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Carl B. Kerrick 
Counsel · 
Hearing Scheduled (Status/Scheduling Carl B. Kerrick 
Conference 05/16/2013 01:15 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Carl B. Kerrick 
Substitute Conflict Free Counsel---Petitioner 
Motion to Withdraw Carl B. Kerrick 
Affidavit in.Support of Motion to Withdraw Carl B. Kerrick 
Order of Withdrawal Carl B. Kerrick 
S1Jbject: Mallory, Gary Wayne II Order Appointing Carl B. Kerrick 
Public Defender Public defender Kwate Law 
Office PD 2013 
Hearing result for Status/Scheduling Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
scheduled on 05/16/2013 01:15 PM: District 
Court Hearing·Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages · 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
05/30/2013 01:15 PM)· 
Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal Carl B. Kerrick 
and to Set for Hearing---State 
Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Status/Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 5/16/2013 . 
Time: 1 :25 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA . 






Date: 8/27/2014 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: DEANNA 
Time: 03:16 PM ROA Report 
~ Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-2013-0000763 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ i, 
~ 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant ~ 
I' ,,
~: 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant ~'. 
Date Code User Judge ~ 









Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
11 
·· Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: les~ than 100 pages !i :, 
HRSC TERESA Hearing S~heduled (Status Conferen.ce Carl B. Kerrick :1 
06/27/2013 01:15 PM) 
MOTN TERESA Motion for Transport----def Carl B. Kerrick 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
. Hearing date: 5/30/2013 · 
Time: 1:15 pm 
Courtroom: i 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler. 
t 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA . 
/1 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
·· Greg Hurn ii 
April Smith , · !I 
~.(~1/2013 ORDR TERESA Transport Order . Carl B. Kerrick 
11 ,I 
6/27/2013 DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Carl B. Kerrick II 'I 
on 06/27/2013 01:~5PM: District Court Hearing !1 [1 
Held ii 1, 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
[! Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
t1 




MINE TERESA Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick H 11 
Hearing·type: Status Conference ii 
Hearing date: 6/27/2013 
11 Time: 1 :22 pm I, 
Courtroom: 
'I 
ii Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA ! 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
April Smith 
Greg Hurn 
7/11/2013 DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 07/11/2013 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages ti ! : 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled {Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
08/15/2013 11 :00 AM) 
4
Date: 8/27/2014 
Time: 03: 16 PM 
Page 3 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000763 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: DEANNA 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
7/11/2013 MINE TERESA Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Status Conference . 
Hearing date: 7/11/2013 
Time: 11 :01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hum 
April Smith 
8/1/2013 MOTN TERESA Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal Carl B. Kerrick 
and set for Hearing 
MISC TERESA Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal Carl B. Kerrick 
8/5/2013 MISC TERESA Brief inSupport of Motion for Summary Disposition Carl B. Kerrick 
and Dismissal--State 
8/14/2013 PETN TERESA . Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD TERESA Affidavit of the Petitioner in Support of Amended Carl B. Kerrick 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
8/15/2013 DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 08/15/2013 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 09/19/2013 Carl B. Kerrick 
02:30 PM) 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/15/2013 
Time: 11 :00 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler · 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hurn 
April Smith 
9/19/2013 ADVS TERESA Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled .on Carl B .. Kerrick 
09/19/2013 02:30 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
DCHH TERESA District Court Hearing Held Carl B. Kerrick 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
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Date: 8/27/2014 
Time: 03: 16 PM 
Page 4 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000763 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant· 
User: DEANNA 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
9/19/2013 MINE TERESA Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: OralArgument 
Hearing date: 9/19/2013 
Time: 2:33 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hum 
Nancy Ceccarelli 
11/7/2013 OPOR TERESA Opinion & Order on Motion for Summary Carl B. Kerrick 
Dispositiort---GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 
IN PART 
2/3/2014 .. HRSC TERESA Hearing Sc.heduled (Scheduling Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
02/20/2014 01:15PM) .. 
TERESA Notice· Of l:iearing Carl B. Kerrick 
.. 
2/20/2014 DCHH TERESA · Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
scheduled on 02/20/2014 01:15 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 04/22/2014 01 :30 Carl B. Kerrick 
PM) 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 2/20/2014 
Time: 1:16 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hurn 
Justin Coleman 
2/21/2014 ORDR TERESA Order for Transport Carl B. Kerrick 
3/14/2014 CHJG SHELLIE Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
ORDR TERESA Administrative Order Assinging Judge---GASKILL Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
4/21/2014 HRVC TERESA Hearing result for Hearing scheduled. on Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
04/22/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Evidentiary Hearing 
4/22/2014 HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 05/01/2014 02:45 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
PM) evidentiary hearing (1 to 2 hours) 
TERESA Notice Of Hearing Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
5/1/2014 ADVS TERESA Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
05/01/2014 02:45 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement evidentiary hearing (1 to 2 hours) 
6
Date: 8/27/2014 
Time: 03: 16 PM 
Page 5 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0000763 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: DEANNA 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
5/1/2014 MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Evidentiary Hearing 
Hearing date: 5/1/2014. 
Time: 2:47 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hurn 
Nance Ceccarelli 
6/10/2014 FFCL TERESA Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Order--State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition--GRANJED 
JDMT TERESA Final Judgment .Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
CDIS TERESA Civil Disposition entered for: State ofldaho, Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defendant; Mallory, Gary Wayne II, Subject. 
Filing date: 6/10/2014 
STAT TERESA Case Status Changed: Closed Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
7/11/2014 APSC DEANNA Appealed ToThe Supreme Court Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
NTAP DEANNA Notice Of Appeal Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
MOTN DEANNA Motion to Withdraw and to Appoint SAPD . Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
7/22/2014 ORDR DEANNA Allowing Allowing Withdravval of Attorney .and Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Appointing· State Appellant· Public Defender's 
Office 
ATTR DEANNA Subject: Mallory, Gary Wayne II Attomey Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Retained Sara B Thomas 
8/8/2014 SCRT DEANNA Supreme Court Receipt - Notice of Defect, Appeal Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Suspended 





~3 APR lt RPI 9 18 
PATIY 0. ~t!~"A.t't }N°l V"'--. 
::: ~KIYJ~~J f,, ~ 
>J/ U/ ~EPUTY 
.,~.;,..,_._..,,.._ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SecOt'lC:i JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Nez::. eef"c...e. 
Cia"''' lJ · Hu Hof\.{ 1L I I 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
,Sf-aie.- cf ldCAba 
Defendant. · 
Case~o.:c-v 13 Ott7o3 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR · 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code § 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the_ department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents fifed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 





l)<1 Plaintiff [ ] Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees, and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) PoS±-CcAu'lc,.., '+f c-0 
believe I'm entitled to get what I am as king for .. 
M0'flt)N-ANt'rAfftBAVlr-feft:Pt:Rf\7ilSSteitt-e··· ·-
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 




1 .:a f _I 
f 
2. [ ] I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [ ] I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a cur rent 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve ( 12) months, 
whichever is less. 
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly · 
balance in my inmate account-for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is pe~ury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen ( 14) 
years. 
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages 
if more space is needed tor any response. 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: G·g;,ry l.J. Ha.l\cry 7[ Othername(s) I have used:___.AJ...&--....,/t.__ _ _ 
Address:38/ LJ. f-{osp,tcJ Dt .. 0('~1(\0 J:J. f:DS:ft/ 
How long at that address? b tna,fh5 Phone: A/ ,4 
Date and place of birth: -3- (7,-7 O Loob Beq,C b G. l ;foe n f o.. 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am [ ~ single ( ] married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse:---------------------------
-- MOTlONAISJO-AFFiDAVfTFDKPEHMlSSIONTU 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 





My other dependents ( including minor children) are: --'A}...,,._..LA.~------------
INCOME: 
Amount of my income:$ Q per [ ] week [ ] month 
Other than my inmate account I have outside money from:-------------
My spouse's income:$ -"'6r per [ ] week [ ] month. 
ASSETS: 











List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Cash 
Notes and Receivables 
Vehicles: 
Bank[Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of De osit 
Trust Funds 
Retirement Accounts/lRAs/401 (k)s 




-- ---MQ-T-10N-.'\N9-AFF+GAVFf-FBR-.PER-MlSSIBN-=fB------ - -- -- -- ---- - -
- --PROCEED .. ONPARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 















EXPENSES: List all of your monthly expenses. 
Expense 
Rent/House Payment Q.:.. 
Vehicle Payment{s) 
Credit Cards: (list each account number) 











- - ---M8TI0N-AN8AFFIBAVIT-F8R-PERMIS-S10N TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 















How much can you borrow? $ ___ :t:5'....._..,__ __ From whom? __ A)-=--=-/t....__ ___ _ 
When did you file your last income tax return? :a-: Amount of refund: $ ::e,-
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided) 
Name Address 
: ::.-:- =· =-· __ :MQI1007~JmrA"""EflDAVITEOR~BfilfSSIOl':il-:TO-·-- -·--·-. 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-1 OC 2/25/2005 
Phone Years Known 
PAGE5 
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= IDOC TRUST OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 04/11/2013 = 
Doc No: 97013 Name: MALLORY II, GARY WAYNE 
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ICIO/Cl PRES FACIL 
TIER-A CELL-16 
Transaction Dates: 04/ll/2012-04/11/2013 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
6.13 395.67 395.00 5.46 
--------------------------------TRANSACTIONS--------------------------------



























































































I hereby certify that these records are true and correct copies of official 
records or reports or entries therein of the Idaho Department of Corrections. 
Dated: t:~ - \\ -q ,7 

















































































Gary W. Mallory 
;I.C.I.-0. Unit C-1 
381 W. Hospital Dr. 
Orofi~o,Id. 83544 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
FILED 
/;;'\ 
1,:.:. . .J 
tfl3 Pl'R 12 AM 9 13 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE~~~<:;~THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FQ:R ... 'l'JJ;E COONlf.i¥ OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 


















) _________________ ) 
case.No. CV13 00.763 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Gary W. Mallory, Petitioner, prose, WHO, pursuant 
to Idaho Code §19-4901, et seq, respectfully presents to this 
honorable court his petition for Post Conviction Relief, where he 
alleges, as follows: 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Idaho 
Correctional Institution at Orofino (ICIO), under 
the custody, care and control of Warden Tamera Carlin. 
2. Petitioner is a duly convicted inmate under Idaho Law, 
serving a twenty-eight (28) year to life (MURDER IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code §18-4001, 18-4002 AND 18-4003), 
two (2) year (DOMESTIC BATTERY, Idaho Code §18-918(2)(a) 










. . ' 
~~:;~%£$$;:;~~:~:~)~:~;~~~:~:~:::}~:~:~:::~:~:~:~:~ 
'-" 
~~;;,;~;i;i~%:;:/:;;::;:::~;:;:r:::;:::~~~::~~~=~A - k~~~~:~i::~;.~.:;:~:~~:d~:;;~:~~~:::-~-~~:-=~~:=:~~:~ ~~~:k{:~~~~:~=::~~;~:;:;:~::~~::::~;\:~~=~:~::;4 : ~;::.;.;<:~i:::;~~~~.~~~::;:~;:::~~::::::;::~;:::~::~~ ·, ~>::~:~:~:~:7:;t~: 
·, --·· -- .. ·: .. ~mll' 7; I~~}: 
3. Petitioner was convicted by,:a .Jvf'/ t;n_-Mqrch{T/ 2010. 
4. Petitioner was represented by Nez Perce county Public 
Defender, Niel P. Cox, of the Second Judicial District. 
5. Petitioner was convicted in the Second Judicial Dist.rict, 
the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick-District Judge, presiding. 
6. The underlying case number is CR09-0172. 
7. Petitioner was sentenced on June.3, 2010. 
8. Petitioner's attorney filed the DIRECT APPEAL on June 7, 
2010. 
9. The DIRECT APPEAL was filed under ICR-Rule 35. 
10. The Idaho Court of Appeals AFFIRMED petitioner's conviction 
on January 3, 2012. 
11. On April 25, 2012, Appellant Counsel filed its PETITION 
FOR REVIEW before the Idaho Supreme Court. 
12. On May 22, 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its 
DENIAL on the PETITION FOR REVIEW. 
13. On May 22, 2012, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued its 
REMITTITUR upon Appellant. 
14. No other motions, petitions, nor applications have been 
filed in this, or any other court, that petitioner is 
aware of. 






Petitioner is seeking Leave to Proceed IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS, and has attached the appropriate documents to 
this petition. 
Petitioner is requesting the appointment of CONFLICT-
FREE counsel in this matter, and has attached the appro-
priate documents for this court's review. 
PetIDtioner is requesting that he be granted the following 
relief: 
a) That this court VACATE and DISMISS, with prejudice, the 
underlying conviction against petitioner; and that all 
charges with respect to and all allegations/information/ 
indictments be dismissed, with prejudice; 
18. Petitioner presents the following issues in which he as~ 
serts that he must be granted relief: 
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL. 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL1CONFLCIT 
OF INTEREST/ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT. 
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
IV. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT/JUDGE. 
V. CUMULATIVE ERRORS. 
19. Petitioner alleges that his Appell~nt Counsel's acts, 
and or, failure to act, caused petitioner to suffer a 
"Dead Bang" looser of an Appeal when not submititing 
vital unconstitutional violations and submitting weaker 
issues before the Idaho Court of Appeals. 














Petitioner further alleges that Appella.nt·:counsel vio-
lated his Constitutional Rights under both the Idaho 
State Constitution, as well as, the United Stat~s Cons-
titutions. 
Petitioner alleges that his court-appointed counsel's 
acts, and or, failure(s) to act, caused petitioner to 
suffer from violations of his rights to effective assis-
tance of counsel, which is guaranteed under both the 
Idaho State Constitution and the United States' Consti-
tution, respectively. 
Petitioner alleges thatr based upon the following acts 
or failure(s) to act, his Constitutional Rights were 
violted by both his APPELLANT COUNSEL and TRIAL COUNSEL, 
by and when counsel(s): 
APPELLANT COUNSEL 
To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an ad-
versary proceeding that -- like a trial -- is governed by intri-
cate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An 
unrepresented appellant -- like an unrepresented defendant at 
trial -- isnunable to protect the vital interests at stake. 
Aopal'.'.!t~n-1.wh9se counsel is unable to provide effective represen-
tation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all. 
POST-CONVICTION: pg. 4 
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A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in ac~ 
cord with due process of law if the appellant does not have "ef-
fective assistance" of an attorney. 
If a state has created appellate courts as 11 an integral part 
of the ••• system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence 
of a defendant, 11 the procedures used in deciding appeals must com-
part with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Constitution. 
The state must provide a transcript to indigent criminal appel-
lants who could not afford to buy one if that was the only way to 
assure an "adequate and effective" appeal. Just as a transcript 
may by rule or custom be a prerequisite to appellate review, the 
services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary 
to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration 
on the merits. 
The right to assistance of counsel on appeal is limited to the 
first appeal as of right, and the attorney need not advance every 
argument, regardless of menit, urged by the app~llant. But the 
attorney must be available to assist in preparing and submitting 
a brief to the appellate court and must play the role of an advo-
cate, rather than a mere friend of the court assisting in a de-
tached evaluation of the appellant's claim. Evitts v. Lucey, 105 
s.ct. 830 (1985). 
Consequently, appellate counsel engageoin a process of '"win-
nowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more 
likely to prevail.n Smith v. Murray, 106 sect. 2661,2667 (1985). 
The weeding out of weak claims to be raised on appeal "is the 
hallmark of effective advocacy," because "every weak issue in 
an appellabe brief or argument detracts from the attention a 
judge can devote to the stronger issues, and reduces appellate 
counsel's credibility before the court." An appellate advocate 
may deliver deficient performance and prejudice a defendant by : ,il 
omliltting a "dead-bang winner}" even though counsel may have 
POST-CONVICTION: pg.5 
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presented strong but unsuccessful claims on appeal. Page v. 
United States, 844 F.2d 300,302 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Petitioner alleges that (a) Appellant Counsel never raised any 
Brady violations [Brady v. Maryland, 83 s.ct. 1194 (1963)], {b) 
never raised and Bagley violations [United States v. Bagley, 105 
s.ct. 3375 (1985)], (c) never raised any Strickland violations 
[Strickland v. Washington, 104 s.ct. 2052 (1984)], (d) never 
raised any Trombetta violations [California v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct. 
2039 (1984)], (e) never raised any Kyles violations {Kyles v. 
Whitley, 115 s.ct. 1555 (1995)], nor (e) never raised any Cronic 
~iolations [U.S. v. Cronic, 104 s.ct. 2039 (1984)]. 
These above constitutional issues would have presented a more 
"Dead-Bang" winner to the Idaho Court of Appeals over those issues 
appellant counsel did present. 
Furthermore, appellant counsel violated several Idaho Rules Of 
Professional Conduct, thus committing Attorney Misconduct during 
the course of representation. I.R.P.C. 1.3. COMMENTARY- [1] "A 
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite oppo-
sition, obstruction or {personal) inconvenience to the lawyer, 
and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to 
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor." I.R.P.C. 1.3. COMMENTARY-
[2] "Alawyer's (workload) must be controlled so that (each) matter 
(can) be (handled) competently." 
However, in Exhibits 1 and 2 clearly reflect how appellant 
counsel's (workload) constricts appellant counsel's ability to 
litigate the matters for the appeal process, and how his per-
sonal life henders meaningful representation due to having to 





These (personal matters) play no excuse(s) in representation 
and clearly violate established law(s). 
The petitioner alleges that "He, and he alone, determines the 
(issues) that should have been addressed on his appeal." Anders 
v. California, 87 s.ct. 1396 (1967) and those issues are as fol-
lows; 
A). Appellant Counsel should have litigated the material fact 
that the petitioner's constitutional rights under Miranda v. Ari-
~, 86 s.ct. 1602 (1996) were violated by the District Court 
where the Judge completely "failed" to view the 0 entire video 
recording" of petitioner's (interrogation) proceedings. The Court 
ba§ed its decision(s) from the allegations the Prosecution alleged 
from the contents of the video recording and those allegations 
were not based on the "totality,of;'the,,recording(s)" of the 
interriogation and petitioner "requesting representation [Counsel] 
a total of six (6) times throughout the (entire) taping. I.R.E. 
1008 clearly define how the petitioner "has the right to present 
the (entire) recording before the court and have any decision(s) 
rendered from the totality of the evidence." Such was not the 
material fact in this case. 
The prosecutor alleged that the petitioner requested counsel 
at a much further time period than what the video recording actu-
ally recorded and as such the prosecutor committed Prosecutorial 
Misconduct during the course of court proceedings. 
B). Appellant: Counsel: should have litigated the material 
fact(s) that the District court erred in precluding the defense 





em;;r.·e· w rl" [l 
C). Appellant Counsel should have litigated the material 
fact(s) that the District Court erred in precluding the defense 
from arguing and presenting a Jury instruction for a Lesser 
Included Offense of Manslaughter. 
D). Appellant Counsel should have combed the record and fully 
litigated any and all irregularities occurred during any pretrial 
and trial proceedings which violated the petitioner's constitutional 
rights to either a "fair trial" or "competent trial proceedings." 
E). Appellant counsel violated petitioner's constitutional 
right(s) of Due Process by allowing the State to file their 
"Response" in an untimely manner. (The record supports this ma-
terial fact). 
TRIAL COUNSEL 
A). Trial Counsel failed to fully investigate the facts of 
petitioner's case andfailed to thoroughly investigate exculpatory 
witnesses and present their testimony before the jury in his trial 
proceedings. Strickland, Id.at 2052. 
B). Trial Counsel failed to meaningfully investigate the crime 
scene. Strickland, Id.at 2052. 
C). Trial Counsel failed to pursue Motions still pending be-
fore the court and prevent the cremation of the victim's body 
before being afforded the opportunity of obtaing an "independant" 
Pathologist's determination(s) of material facts in support of 
his client's theory of events, defenses and cause of death. 
State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 989 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1999); 





In Trombetta, the Supreme Court held "evidence must both pos-
sess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence 
was destroyed, and be of such that the defendant would be unable 
to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means." Id.at 
2534. 
The state cremated the victim before the petitioner's counsel 
bothered to pursue the MOTION that was in fact, pending for ruling 
before the court seeking exculaptory material and determination{s) 
into highly potential exculpatory material, and therefore, any 
opportunity to gain this vital evidence became forever destroyed 
as the petitioner's counsel sat-on-his-duff and did absolutely 
nothing to either "pursue" the Motion, of force the court into 
"rulingll on the important Motion sitting before it. 
Such conduct constitutes·both a Trombetta and Bagley unconsti-. 
tutional violation{s) and the petitioner has to suffer the conse-
quence(s) of such an Incompetent Counsel as his trial counsel 
was, at a vital stage of representation(s). 
Not only would the independent Pathology test(s) hold vital 
exculpatory material, but would have also provided the petitioner 
a strategic source to subject the state's theory and allegations 
to meaningful adversarial testing(s) and such failure(s) of 
defense counsel violates the petitioner's constitutional rights of 
Due Process and Equal Protection. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 s.ct. 
2527 {2003); Williams v. Taylor, 120 s.ct. 1495 (2000). u.s.c.A. 
Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13. 
Trial counsel was not (educated) in the field of Forensic 
Pathology and was fully unable to either cross-examine state's 
witness or challenge any evidence presented by the state in this 
fiidd. State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 307, 986 P.2d 323,330 
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D). Trial Counsel failed to investigate numerous "material 
fact" winesses that would have disputed the state's theory and 
state witness' testimony presented before the jury. Thus, such 
unconstitutional failure(s) violated the petitioner's constitu-
tional rights and clearly established law(s) a~judtcated by the 
Supreme Court and hendered petitioner's rights to present a 
complete defense. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815,834 (9th Cir. 
1995); Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 s.ct. 1087 (1985); see also Strickland, 
Id.at 2052. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13. 
Furthermore, this exculpatory testimony equates to "suppressed 
evidence" under the Bagley standards. 
E). Trial Counsel failed to investigate not only any witness 
the petitioner informed him of, counsel fully failed to investigate 
any information provided to (him) by petitioner during the (entire) 
course(s) of representation(s) in a Capital Murder case. Strickland, 
Id.at 2052. 
F). Trial counsel failed toinv.est.igate:iany,.allegedfact(s) 
that the state's witnesses were to testify to before the jury 
during any proceeding(s). Such failure(s) violated the petitioner's 
constitutional rights, as well as, clearly established law(s). 
Strickland, Id.at 2052. 
G). Trial Counsel failed to adequately discuss any of the 
Discovery Material with the petitioner during any vital stage(s) 
of representation(s). Thus, the petitioner was hampered from 
providing any meaningful information that would warrant meaningful 
investigation(s), or that would have aided in strategic adversarial 
testing(s) of the state's evidence. Strickland, Id.at 2052; I.R.P.C. 
1 .4. (a)(1),(2),(3),(b) COMMENTARY [1]; EXPLAINING MATTERS [5]; 




H). Trial Counsel totally failed at providing (any) meaningful 
"consultation" with the petitioner during the course(s) of repre-
sentation(s). Furthermore, counsel (never) discussed any type(s) 
of trial strategies whatsoever. This total failure(s) violated 
petitioner's constitutional rights under both Federal and State 
Constitutions and clearly established law(s). Strickland, Id.at 
2052; u.s.c.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13; I.R.P.C. 
1.4. COMMUNICATION - EXPLAINING MATTERS [5); 
I). Trial Counsel failed to investigate the material fact(s) 
that would indeed substantiate the fact(s) that the victim was in 
a "previous" auto accident which resulted in "injuries to her 
rib cage." This material fact(s) was vital because the state attri-
buted this prejudicial matter to the petitioner and the investigation 
would have both, resulted in exculpatory evidence, and disputed the 
state's allegation(s). Strickland, Id.at 2052. 
J). Trial Counsel refused any type(s) of investigation(s) into 
an individual that even some Police Officers highly suspected in 
the homicide of the victim and the material fact(s) that this 
individual "suddenly packed up and left the state" shortly after 
the homicide. An investigation into this vital matter was more 
than warranted until subject matter(s) either resulted in a posi-
tive result, or negative result. Strickland, Id.at 2052; I.R.P.C. 
PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES - "As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the 
adversary system. 11 
K). Trial Counsel failed to fully litigate/argue the f.act(s) .r 
that the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated by law 
enforcement during the course of (interrogation) by the po.lice 
after the petitioner (requested) counsel (before) answering any 
questions. During court proceeding(s), the court permitted the 
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prosecution to play a very limited portion of the video-recording 
of the interrogation which showed petitioner "asking for counsel 
at a later time period," however, had the entire video-recording 
been viewed, the court would have seen the material fact(s) that 
the petitioner "asked for counsel" at several different intervals 
of the recording. This conduct of the Court, Prosecution and 
Defense Counsel violated the petitioner's constitutional rights 
under both Federal and State Constitutions, as well as, clearly 
established law)s). Beech Aircraft Corporation v. Rainer, 109 
s.ct. 439,464 (1988); Strickland, Id.at 2052; I.R.E. 1008. 
The petitioner contends that the (Judge) in to be both ••• 
mindful of events in his court room, as well as, the gate-keeper 
in protecting those constitutional rights of the accused on trial 
in his court room. General Electric Company v. Joiner, 118 s.ct. 
512,517 (1997); United States v. Carey, 493 F.3d 36 (C.A. 1 2007); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 86 s.ct. 1602 (1966); Strickland, Id.at 2052. 
U.S. C. A. Const. Amends. 6, 1 4; Const. Art. 1 , § 1 3 • 
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. To determine whether counsel's 
errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial, this court must com-
pare the evidence that actually was presented to the jury with that 
which could have been presented had counsel acted appropriately. 
Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815,834 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Counsel must, at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation 
enabling him to make informed decisions about how hest to repre-
sent his client. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446,1456 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
Essential to effective representation ••• is the independant 
duty to investigate and prepare. Birt v. Montgomery, 709 F.2d 
690,701 (11th Cir. 1983). It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct 
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a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to 
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of 
the case and the penalty in the event of conviction ••• The 
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions 
or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the 
accused's stated desire to plead guilty. Pretrial investigation 
and preparation(s) are the keys to effective representation of 
counsel. 
Adequate consultation between attorney and client, the inter-
viewing of, important witnesses, and adequate investigation of 
potential defenses are all essential elements of meaningful re-
presentation(s) of defense counsel. United States v. Tucker, 716 
F.2d 576 1 581 (9th Cir. 1983); I.R.P.C. 1.1.; 1.2.; 1.4.; Const. 
Art.1,§13. 
L). The petitioner further contends that neither Lead Counsel 
nor Co-Counsel were "qualified" under the· ·'Idaho Criminal Rules 
to litigate a case in which the Death Penalty might have been 
imposed upon the petitioner. I.C.R. 44.3. 
The petitioner alleges that just because his attorneys were 
licensed to practice law, does not mean that they are "qualified" 
in a court of law to represent a capital case. 
Because the totality of counsel's failures to meaningful re-
presentation(s), this court must find that the petitioner suffered 
results of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Attorney Misconduct 
and Conflict of Interest throughout the (entire) course of repre-
sentation of trial counsel(s). Strickland, Id.at 2052. 
PROSECUTOR 
The petitioner contends that the Prosecutor violated his cons-
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titutional rights in the following manner(s); 
A). During the course of court proceeding(s), there were 
several meetings with Defense Counsel, District Judge, and the 
Prosecution. Everyone of. these "In Chambers Hearings" were never 
recorded and the petitioner was never 11 informed11 by any judicial 
official(s) about any of these In Chambers Hearings, let alone 
the purpose(s) or result(s) of these pertinent hearings. until 
these court officials achieved the sought after result(s). 
B). ·nuring trial proceedings where the court was seeking to 
·resolve the petitioner's Miranda argument(s), the prosecution 
(redacted) vital portions of the video-recording of the Interro-
gation proceeding(s) and only presented the (portion) the prose-
cutor felt would best bolster their [prosecution's] case. The 
prosecutor informed the court that the petitioner requested assis-
tance/appointment of counsel at a very late stage of the interro-
gation proceeding(s), when in fact, there were 11 several 11 periods 
on the recording that clearly reflected the petitioner requesting 
(counsel), yet, the (Police) continued to interrogate the peti-
tioner. 
Not only did the (Police) violate the petitioner's constitu-
tional rights and.clearly established law(s), the prosecution also 
were active participants in violating the petitioner's constitu-
tional rights and clearly established law(s). 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 86 s.ct. 1602 (1966) the Supreme Court 
held 11 If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the 
interrogation (must cease) until the attorney (is) present. At 
that time, the individual (must) have an opportunity to (confer) 
with the attorney.and have him (present) during subsequent ques-
tioning." Id.at 1628. (emphasis in original). 
Had the Court been afforded the full opportunity, and not 
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just taken the word of the prosecutor, the court would have been 
able to see that the petitioner in fact, sought counsel at several 
intervals of the interrogation proceeding(s), and the court would 
have based its determination(s) on the "competent evidence" that 
existed and the petitioner holds the right under clearly established 
law(s) to have presented in the course(s) of a "fair trial." State 
v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498';·504,616 ~.2d 1034,1040 (1980); State v. 
Fowler, 13 Idaho 317,89 P. 757 (1907); State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 
44,71 P. 608,611 (1903); State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,163 
P.3d 1175,1181 (2007);.Const. Art. 1,§13. 
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an 
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rest on the 
. government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his 
right to retained or appointed counsel. Miranda, Id.at 1628. 
As stated above, the interrogation continued long after the 
petitioner requested counsel and the totality of the video-recording 
clearly reflects this material fact. 
Thus, the state violated the petitioner's constitutional rights 
during the interrogation and presented "redacted, ·evidence" to 
bolster the state's case. Const. Art. 1,§13. 
During the appeal process, the appellant counsel pointed out 
how both the Prosecution and Court essentially violated his 
[petitioner's] constitutional rights by not introducing the 
complete version of the interrogation recording and the Court 
basing its decision(s) on non-complete evidence. (see Exhibit No. 
7 , pg • 2 , # 1 0 ) • 
This conduct clearly violates the petitioner's constitutional 
rights of "competent evidence" and "fair trial." Const. Art.1,§13. 
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Furthermore, regarding the Miranda issue ••• the prosecutor 
used the "field interrogation;•• (i.e.) on erime scene, against the 
petitioner solely because of the petitioner's actions and com-
ments ddis.played ,to the Police. 
The petitioner simply asked~for cigarette; allowance to use 
the restroom.and an opportunity to speak to other residents at the 
scene ••• and was told "no" by the Police. When the petitioner 
reached the front yard, petitioner simply placed himself on his 
knees, with his hands behind his back ••• this action was displayed 
due to interactions the petitioner has had with.law enforcement 
in his past. 
Also, the petitioner's actions were due to the material fact 
that he [petitioner] was in the bedroom with the deceased victim 
when the Police arrived on scene. 
The petitioner's "movement" was "controlled" at all times by 
thel.1Pichl±ce, the petitioner was not allowed to "speak" to others 
at the crime scene, so the petitioner felt that since his movement 
and association( s) were under control at all times equated to :· 
being under arrest. 
The "ultimate inquiry" when determining whether a defendant/ 
petitioner was in custody during an interrogation "is simply 
whether there was a formal arrest or (restraint) on (freedom) of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. This 
inquiry is informed by considering the "totality of the circum~:-
stances, 11 and asking whether in light of the circumstances of the 
interrogation, "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she 
was not at ( liberty) to terminate the interrogation and leave." 
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,112 (1995). 
The petitioner was never given his Miranda warnings. Regardless 
of petitioner's actions, there was no action that warranted the 




After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity 
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and interlligently 
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a 
statement. But unless and until such warnings are demonstrated by 
the prosecution at trial, (no) evidence obtained as a result of 
interrogation can be useq against him [petitioner]. Miranda, Id. 
at 1630. 
The contained facts are dispositive (1) the presence of six (6) 
to eight (8) Officers at the home; (2) the petitioner was confronted 
with an unholstered gun in his dark bedroom with the deceased; (3) 
the physical control the police maintained ·over the petitioner at 
all times; (4) the length of control over the petitioner by the 
police; ·and (5) the coercive statements made by the police at scene, 
which were designed to elicit cooperation from t~e petitioner while 
carefully avoiding giving the petitioner Miranda warning(s) are 
elements that both the court and Prosecution, as well as, Defense 
Counsel should have lawfully taken into the totality of bircum-
stance(s) before permitting the prosecution to present any form(s) 
of testimany before the jury. 
Where the Supreme court held "No (evidence) obtained as a 
f~~ti1t of interrogation can be (used) against the petitioner, thus, 
permitting Officer (Zack Ward) to testify regarding the petitioner's 
action(s) equates to nothing more than ••• "evidence." Id.at 1630. 
The petitioner is not "assumed" to be guilty solely due to his 
actions, yet, the Prosecution and Polite presented such a theory 
to the jury for its deliberation(s). 
C). During trial proceeding(s), there was testimony from the 
Police [Zack Ward] where allegations were made regarding "scratch 
marks" on the petitioner's back. 
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Testimony was offered that "the scratch marks came from the 
victim." 
However, there was material evidence that clearly depicted the 
pet:iti.dmer .had "ri.o" 1 so.:ca:tch -marks. dn the interrogation video 
recording. ·yet, this material evidence was never offered to the 
jury and the petitioner maintained that "the scratch marks .were 
the result(s) of a physical alte_rcatio.n that he [petitioner] had 
with several police officers because the petitioner was.unpset 
and unruly over being contained in a interrogation room for five 
(5) hours, no water to drink, no restroom opportunity, complete 
refusal to being permitted to consultation(s) with Counsel and a 
totality of treatment the petitioner grew upset with. 
The altercation resulted with the petitioner being "hand cuffed" 
behind his back for over four (4) hours for no justifiable reason 
and petitioner "slammed to the floor" with his hands cuffed and 
behind his back ••• thus scratching his lower back. 
The evidence showed the petitioner with no previous scratches 
to his lower back, yet, the Prosecution and Police offered testi-
mony that was in clear contradiction with material evidence/rele-
vant evidence and the court permitted the testimony to being offered 
regardless of the facts. 
The scratch marks in Stat~Js Exhibits (6) and (7) were pro-
claimed to be defensive wounds caused by the victim while the 
petitioner allegedly strangled her. 
Yet, absolutely no evidence was ever offered:that conclusively 
supported this theory, while material/relevant evidence sat kept 
away from the court and jury that would lawfully dispute both the 
testimony and evidence created by "fabricated" testimony. 
Every person accused of crime in Idaho has the right to a fair 
~nd :impartial trial, whether guilty or inftocent, it is the duty 
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of the~prosecutor to see that the petitioner has a fair trial, 
and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury. 
They should not exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far 
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in 
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. 
There was never any "evidence" presented to the jury that the 
scratches were created by the victim and the prosecutor is required 
to mee~ the burden of proof beyond ·a reasonable doubt. Where the 
prosecutor argues facts not in evi.<:].ence, such conduct conveys the 
impression to the jury that the prosecution knows things that the 
jury does not [facts] and may induce the jury to trust the state's 
judgment rather than t~s own view of the evidence. 
Such conduct equates to "Prosecutorial Misconduct" in violation 
of clearly established law(s). Berger v. United states, 55 s.ct~ 
629 (1935)("The prosecutor is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of 
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor 
indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about 
just one. It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater 
or less degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so 
plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully 
observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and 
especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much 
weight against the accused when they should properly carry none~). 





D), During trial proceeding(s), the prosecution presented 
testimony from state's witness (Larry Shafer) which was known to 
be false, yet, went forward with the planned testimony. 
The prosecution knew that certain testimony was false because 
other potential witnesses offered evidence that completely dis-
puted the offered testimony of (Shafer). 
Such unlawful conduct violates I.R.P.C. 3.3. COMMENTARY -
OFFERING EVIDENCE [5],[6),[8]. i.e. (Larry !hafer provided tes~ 
timony which the prosecution was fully aware potential .witnesses 
[Kathy Owens, Debra Ann Shelmanrand Margaret s. Mallory] all 
provided previous statements which lawfully "disputed" said 
testimony of (Shafer).~ ti'-lt, ~0 l, t 
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
The defendant contends that the District Court, Judge (Merica) 
violated his constitutional rights of equal protection, as well 
as, his right to a 11 fair trial" in the following manner(s). 
A). On February 18, 2009, Defense Counsel (Robert Van Idour) 
filed his MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION OF PATHOLOGIST in order 
to obtain an Independant Autopsy on the victim's remains. 
However, on February 25, 2009, the victim's remains were 
"cremated" and the Court completely "failed" to "rule" on the 
vital Motion pending Before it and the Court had ample time to 
make a ruling and permit the defendant the opportunity to obtain 
vital exculpatory material for his defense. 
The district court is not required to order discovery "unless 
necessary to protect an applicant's 'substantial rights'." Griffith 
v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d 94,98 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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The defendant contends that not only did he have a constitutional 
right under the due process clauses of both the federal and state 
constitutions 1 to the independant Pathologist examination(s) on the 
victim, but he [defendant] also had a due process constitutional 
right under the sixth amendment of effective assistance of counsel 
where counsel is not educated in Forensic Science and an expert 
witness was required to subject the state's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing(s) and the Pathologist was the sole source of 
obtairt~ng the vitai evidence and testimony. 
Furthermore, where the Court failed in its duty to "rule" on 
pending Motions before the Court in a meaningful time period of 
clearly established law [I.C.R. 12(d)] and the Motion sits before 
the Court and is never determined, as the victim's body is cre-
mated before the court rules, such conduct from the court equates 
into "Fundamental Error." State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594,597,826 
P.2d 1306,1309 (1992); State v. Sheaha~, 139 Idaho 267,281, 77 P. 
3d 956,970 (2003); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,180, 824 P.2d 109, 
111 (1991). 
The defendant contends that the Court's failure to rule on 
such a vital Motion cannot be considered "Harmless Error." Without 
the opportunity of the Independant Pathology Testing(s), the 
defendant lost every opportunity to subject the state's case to a 
meaningful adversarial testing and since the cremation, the de-
fendant has forever lost any opportunity of obtaining such evi-
dence in any other manner. Such, violates the defendant's cons-
titutional rights and clearly established law(s) of California v. 
Trombetta, 104 s.ct. 2528 (1984); Brady v. Maryland, 83 s.ct. 
1194 ( 196 3) • O. S. C. A. Const. Amend. 6, 1 4; Const. Art. 1 , § 1 3. 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), the judge is required to "rule" on 
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pending Motions within fourteen (14) days or seven (7) days be-
fore trial, whichever comes first. 
However, on February.18, 2009, defense counsel filed his 
MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION OF PSYCHIATRIST/PSYCHOLOGIST and 
the court finally "ruled" on this vital motion on August 14, 2009, 
well over the mandated limitation period and the defendant was 
not interviewed until nearly six (6) months later. 
Such time pe.riod extended the period which an accurate mental 
evaluation could have been made on-the defendant and subjected the 
defendant to an inaccurate evaluation which constituted Fundamental 
Error as a result of the court's failute(s) to act in the mandated 
time period. 
The MOTIONCs) TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, 
MOTION TO APPOINT RESOURCE JUDGE, were finally "ruled" on long 
after potential witnesses memories of events were lost, evidence 
was changed/lost, and many other prejudicial factors weighed against 
the defendant's opportunity of "presenting a complete defense" in 
violation of both clearly established law(s) and his constitutional 
rights. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13. see also 
Ake v. oklahom~, 105 s.ct. 1087 (1985). 
The defendant contends that there was ample evidence presented 
to the jliry regarding "intoxication11 and such evidence lawfully 
deminishes the degree of murder, from first degree, to second 
degree murder. 
During jury instructions, the court only provided an ambiguous 
instruction for "second degree murder." The jury was never infor-
med that they could take into consideration the material fact(s) 
that the defendant was "intoxicated11 at the time of the offense. 
The jury was. only provided a definition(s) to the elements 
that constituted First Degree Murder, and offered "If you unani-
mously agree that the special circumstances has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilt)[ 





There is absolutely "no mention" or definition(s) to the jury 
which would define how the jury could take into consideration(s) 
that "the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense 
and such an element could lawfully be considered in deliberation(s) 
of the lesser offense of second degree murder." 
The defendant contends that the jury instruction(s) for the 
lesser. offense of second degree murder elements i$ too ambiguous 
to lead the jury into i·ts deliberati;on( s) elements for the tip.ding 
of Second Degree Murder and a cleare~ e~pl~nation should hav~ been 
- ,. - ,- . ( •-
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provided to the jury. 
The defendant contends that such an ambiguous .i.ns.f.ructiorr .. 
denies him his constitutional rights of being tried in a "fair 
trial" and convicted with "competent evidence." 
I.e. §19-2132 clearly states 11 ••• , the court (must) state to 
them (all) matters of law necessary for their information." 
As previously contended, the court never instructed the jury 
that intoxication could be considered in the defense against the 
elements of first degree murder. 
Thereby, the defendant contends that this inaction .. constitutes 
Fundamental Error and violates his constitutional rights of both 
- .. 
due process and equal protection. Const. Art. 1,§13. 
The defendant further contends, his Fourth (4th) Amendment 
I, 
i 
Right was violated when District Judge (Brudie),~Officer (Birdsell), 
_and Prosecutor (Vowels) all agreed that "the search warrant, al-
though incomplete, was a 'valid' instrument of the law and was all 
that was needed to be in 'compliance' with the search and seizure 
of places and items taken." 
The defendant holds, even if the wa:r:rant was found to be "valid" 
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the· duffle bag could be taken as evidence, however, the "contents" 
·could not be used withoutthe acquisition of an "additional war-
rant" lawfully allowing the police to "search inside the duffle 
bag" and confiscate the "contents within" as "evidence." 
If the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in 
"plain v:few" is contraband without conducting some further search 
of the object - i.e., if its incriminating character [is not] im-
mediately.apparent, the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its 
seizure. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 s.ct. 1149 (1987). 
Where an officer who is executing a valid search for one item 
seizes a different item, the United States Supreme Court rightly 
has been sensitive to the danger ••• that officers will enlarge 
a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, 
into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at 
will. Texas v. Brown, 103 s.ct. 1535,1546-47 (1983). 
Here, the officer's were conducting a search that was lawfully 
"invalid,'' and after confiscating items from the residence, returned 
back to the court to seek a warrant that correctly authorized the 
confiscation of the property previously discovered, which was not 
within the "plain-view d~ctrine," and such unlawful conduct is 
in violation(s) of clearly established law(s) of Arizona v. Hicks, 
Id.at 1149. 
The plain-view doctrine may be applied where the following 
three elements exist. First, the officers' vantage point must be 
lawfully gained. Second, the incriminating evidence must be dis-
covered as a by-product of othei permissible police activity. 
Finally, the incriminating nature of the items must be imme-
diately apparent to the officers. State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 
781, 760 p.2d 1197 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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The defendant contends that the items within the duffle bag 
had absolutely nothing to do with 11 criminal activity11 to justify 
the actions of the police. State v. Biggs, 1.13 Idaho 595, 746 
P.2d 1054 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The defendant lawfully contends that where the police are 
performing their ~uty off of an "invalid" warrant, the clearly 
established law(s) under Biggs doctrine does not apply in order 
to justify their unlawful/conduct and returning to the court 
(after) conducting the search and retaining a different warrant 
does not support such unconstitutional conduct and the court 
again committed Fundamental Error by both, issuing the doctored 
warrant and then refusing the defendant the opportunity to have 
the unlawful evidence "suppressed." 
The defendant contends that the unconstitutional action(s) of 
the police cannot be considered "harmless error" for the illegally 
obtained items were used to "allege" that the defendant was attemp-
ting to flee ••• such was not the case. The defendant was never 
afforded any opportunity to challenge the allegations of the police 
and prosecution and was never afforded his due process in the 
course of litigation. 
The it~ms illegally retained equate to "Fruit of the Poisonous 
Tree" and cannot be used in the manner the defendant was forced to 
suffer~ --
The items were not "incriminating" in any fashion, yet, the 
prosecution was allowed to present such allegations as the court 
forbid the defendant any opportunity to defend against such un-
const:itutionall.conduct. ( see Exhibits 9 (a), ( b), (c), ( d) ( 1), ( d) ( 2), 
(d)(3),(d)(4),(d)(5),(d)(6),(e),(f),(g),(h),(i)). 
The defendant further contends that he [defendant] was subjected 
to Judicial Bias when the court refused to fully adjudicate the 
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defendant's request for a Continuance in order to locate and 
investigate a vital witness whom was also suspect of being in-
volved in the homicide. 
The defendant requested on several ocassions that his counsel 
subpoena (Wes Hardy) back to Idaho from Oklahoma and investigate 
this individual whom several police officers believed to be the 
individual involved in the homicide. 
The defendant contends that counsel's performance also fell 
below ptevailing prof~ssional nor~s of effective assistance of 
counsel where both the court and counsel refused to allow any 
opportunity to investigate and examine any exculpatory evidence 
. . ---- - -
which very well could have exonerated him [defendant] from the 
charge of first degree murder. see Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 
1099,1103 (9th Cir. 1992); Jones v. wood, 114 F.3d 1002 (C.A. 9 
1997); .Strickland v. Washington, 104 s.ct. 2052 (1984). 
Furthermore, the court failed to investigate the material fact 
that one of the State's witnesses (Amber Taylor) was in fact a 
relation [Cousin] to defense counsel (Cox) and a conflict of 
interest resulted in this material fact. 
Defense Counsel was prejudice towards his client and reluc-
tant to fully defend his client against family members and this 
material fact(s) was also in violation(s) of the Rul~s ·of ~r6-
fessional Conduct. 
The court also failed to enter any such Conflict of Interest 
on record. 
Petitioner asserts that the combination of all of the errors 
produced by defense counsel, even if individually harmless, 
requires relief based upon the CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE. 
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Petitioner asserts several different areas in which his trial 
counsel was ineffective in representing him and counsels' action 
_{ .. 
and-or inaction created a prejudicial outcome of the judicial 
process that petitioner was facing at that time. Even if the court 
finds that each error, individually, was harmless, in the aggre-
gate, they show an absence of a fair trial, and-or judicial pro-
cess, and a violation of the petitioneri~ right to effective 
assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by both the Idaho and United 
States' Constitutions, respectively. 
The Ninth {9th) Circuit has held that: "We find that the trial 
court erred in four rulings. We must determine whether they were 
more probable than not harmless, or whether the error did not have 
'substantial influence' over the verdict [or the adversarial/ 
judicial process]. We conclude that the cumulative effect of the 
errors dep~ived the defendant/petitioner of a fair trial ••• " U.S. 
v. Tory, 52 F.3d 207 (C.A. 9 1995); Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 
825 (C.A. 9 2002). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
A). Petitioner request that this Honorable Court hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of each claim that 
' petitioner has presented before this Court; 
B). That this Court provide CONFLICT-FREE counsel for the 
petitioner; at the States' expense, in order to investigate these 
claims and properly present them before the Court; 
CL That this Court find that petitioners I constitutional 






















D). GRANT whatever else that this Honorable Court deems ap-
propriate in this matter, in order to rectify the Constitutional 
violations that petitioner has suffered, because .of the acts, 
and-or failure(s) to act, by court-appointed in this matter. 
DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY 
I declare unq.er penalty of perjury that I am the Petitioner 
in this action, that I have writteniread this PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF, and that the information contained in this· 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF is true and correct. 28 u.s.c. 
§1746; 18 u.s.c. §1621. 
Gary Mallory 
Reg. No • 9701 3 
ICIO 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Gary Mallory, do hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, has been mailed, 
via the ICIO Prison Legal Mail System to: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
1221 F St., P.O.Box 1267 
Lewiston,Id. 83501 
Second Judicial District Court 
Clerk of the Court 
Gary Mallory 
Reg. No. 97013 
ICIO 
381 W. Hospital dr. 
Orofino,Id. 83544 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston,Id. 83501 
April Ji, 2013 
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Law Supplemental Narrative: 
Supplemental Narratives 
Seq Name Date Narrative 
42 Birdsell Brian 01:48:26 02/20/2009 
Lewiston Police Supplemental Narrative 
09-L2220 
Detective Birdsell, #332 
2 O February o 9 
Typed by: #366 
On 02-18-09 I went to District Judge Jeff Brudie's office along with Sgt. 
Arneson. We were there to do search warrant returns on the warrant for the 
evidence taken from Gary Mallory as wel·l as the ev:i,dence taken from 1835 7th 
Avenue an~ the SlO pickup. 
While Sgt. Arneson was filing his search warrant return for the evidence taken 
from Gary Mallory, I reviewed the paperwork for the warrant I had served on 
1835 7th Avenue as well as the pickup stored at the LPD storage unit. While 
reviewing this paperwork, "'I noticed that on the search warrant, tlie information 
regarding the property referred to and consists of was missing from the search 
warrant. It appears that while I was.typing tliis warrant, I had copied and 
pasted the information from the affidavit over to the search warrant. While 
doing this, somehow the property referred to and consists of section of the 
warrant was omitted. This was not done intentionally and was a clerical error 
on my part. 
I brought this information to the attention of Judge Brudie and stated there 
was an error on the search warrant. Judge Brudie then suggested I contact the 
NFC Prosecutors office regarding this error. 
I made contact with Prosecutor Mia Vowels and advised her of the error for the 
search warrant. We reviewed the search warrant and found that all of the 
information regarding the place to be searched was correct and accurate, 
however the property referred to was missing from the search warrant. There was 
no difference in the wording between the search warrant and affidavit regarding 
the place to be searched, however what we were searching for was missing. Upon 
looking at the affidavit, I found that the search warrant return contained the 
exact property which we had listed in the affidavit, but it was missing from 
the search warrant. When I served the search warrant on the residence, I had 
the affidavit with me and had read this as well, however missed that it was 
missing from the search warrant. 
on 02-19-09 I responded back to Judge Brudie's chambers and at that time I 
filed the search warrant return with the error in the search warrant. He signed 
an order to hold the evidence at LPD as well as the search warrant returns. 







Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
.:·elephone: (208) 799-3073 
Idaho State Bar No. 2923 · 
mo~ rFB 18 Prl 3 OY 
CLERK OF THE 01ST. COURT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
APPLICATION FOR A 
SEARCH WARRANT. 
WARRANT 
STATE OF ID AHO) 
: ss. 
County ofN ez Perce ) 
) CASE NO. ____ _ 
) AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH 
COMES NOW, Detective Brian Birdsell, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
That affiant is the applicant for Search Warrant herein; 
That affiant is a duly appointed, qualified and acting peace officer within the County of 
Nez Perce, State ofldaho; 
That affiant is employed by the Lewiston Police Department, in the official capacity or 
position of Detective, currently assigned to the Investigation Section as a detective. 
That affiant has been a trained and qualified peace officer for approximately (9) Yz nine 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 1 
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and one half years; 
That affiant holds a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Lewis-Clark State 
College. That affiant has approximately 1800 hours of training and holds an Advanced Peace 
Officers Standards and Training Certificate. The training which the affi.ant has received has been 
in the areas of general patrol procedures, DUI enforcement, drug enforcement, interview and 
interrogation techniques, accident reconstruction and investigation, advanced evidence collection, 
domestic violence, stalking, as well as general investigative techniques of crimes against persons 
.... 
and property. 
Furthermore, a:ffiant has received training in and has experience in the investigation of 
theft, fraud, burglary, and possession of stolen property. 
That there is reasonable cause to believe that certain evidence hereinafter described is 
located in or upon the following described person to-wit; Gazy Wayne Mallory,  , 
a white male approximately 6 feet O inches in height with brown hair and brown eyes and 
weighing approximately 200 pounds. 
That the property referred to and sought consists of any and all physical evidence that is 
related to the person of the deceased subject, or instrumentalities and/or the manner of her death, 
e.g.: blood and or DNA samples, trace evidence, fingerprints and palm prints, fingernail 
scrapings, hair, fiber, and/or other microscopic elements, related to the cause of Charlene Mabie's 
death, possibly related to a death investigation of Charlene Marie Mallory, A.K.A. Charlene Marie 
Mabie, from the person of Gary Mallory, the clothing, boots, and any electronic devices worn by 
or in the possession of Gary Mallory at the time of his detention by police on February 14, 2009. 
That in support of your affi.ant's assertion and belief as to the existence _of probable cause, 
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believes to be true, to-wit: 
On 2-14-2009 at 1140 hrs Lewiston Police Officer were dispatched to a report of a 
deceased subject located at 1835 7th Avenue in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. Officer Rick 
Fuentes and Zach Ward arrived on scene. They were contacted by Timothy Feldman Sr. who 
flagged the officers down and asked if they were responding to the homicide. Feldman said Gary 
Mallory was there with his deceased wife and they were in the downstairs bedroom. 
~ers went into the residence and into the Southeast bedroom in the basement Th~. 
- ------aw Gary Mallory laying in bed with bis wife. Mallory said that the medics needed to hurry and 
~ve to.._check on his wife. Mallory said that,sl!e had just sgueezed his h?,D.d and talked with him 
· IJ c'JIV11 "<. cvb[c./f TV'\~ 'o~ 1 ~ <; 0/l ."#1~ ro1e, .S~ C, \ '.J ~ \ . .t; (,uC\6 ~ -~ ' ~e.i 
just minutes prior to police arrival. Officer ~ach War~ ec~ the pulsecJof Charlene allory and 
C~f:'tcerS (,uCr...,(c} ea~ V,cQrc) C.J.1 ~ 0ei.c ~ 8f'Qn ;; 
determined she was deceased, cold to. the touch, and rigor mortis had already set in. Officer 
advised Gary Mallory that his wife was deceased. Gary Mallory stood up and immediately put bis 
hands behind his back. Gary Mallory kept saym.g th.at the medics needed to hurry up and Officers 
f'c::>'0i1t.11.S ou~ 't-1'1..-~ \Jl'l01~ 
advised him again that she was deceased. Gary Mallory was escorted to the upstairs of the 
residence. Gary Mallory kept his hands behind his back the entire time he was walking up the 
stairs and outside of the residence. Officers advised that they at no time told him to do this and 
---------------------' 
was voluntary on his part. Gary Mallory was not handcuffed at that time. 
Once outside Gary Mallory stepped off the porch and immediately went down to his knees 
where he kept his hands behind his back and asked for a cigarette that one of his friends provided. 
Gary Mallory mentioned several times that he~ to be taken to jail. When asked he wouldn't 
say why he needed to be taken to jail. 
.~ r •; 
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Gary Mallory told Officer Zach Ward that his dad had picked him up from the bar this 
morning. Mallory then said that he had stayed at a friend's house this morning. Mallory said that 
he left the house around 0130 hrs and had just returned to the house and observed that she was 
passed out, he then put a blanket over her and left the residence. Mallory wouldn't identify the 
friend where he was at this mornjng. Mallory then said he stayed at his dad's house. Mallory told 
Ofc Ward that he had also done a carpet job this morning as well. Ofc Zach Ward said Mallory 
told him he wasn't at his dad's house either and had been at the Lucky Inn and Overtime. Mallory 
said he then went to someone else house to get some tools, a Tom Bonine at 213 5 21st Street. 
Mallory said he came back to the residence around 0630 this morning and Charlene 
Mallory was alive. He also said that Charlene Mallory was alive until around 10 minutes prior to 
officers' arrival. 
Officer Zach Ward took digital photographs of blood droplet on the right pant leg of Gary 
Mallory prior to his being brought to Lewiston Police Department ·· 
Cpl George Hill interviewed the complainant to this call, Timothy Feldman Sr. Feldman 
Sr. said that Gary Mallory and Charlene Mallory had lived in the basement of his son, Timothy 
Feldman Jr.' s house for about 3 or 4 months. Feldman Sr. said that Charlene Mallory returned 
home around 2330 to 0000 hrs and is intoxicated. Charlene Mallory made a statement that she 
can't take anymore of this and went downstairs to go to bed. Feldman Sr. said that Gary Mallory 
came home from the bar around O 13 0 hrs and went straight downstairs . 
.A.round 0830 hrs he woke up to Gary Mallory setting on the couch with a very odd look on 
his face. Mallory asked that Feldman Sr. go dovro. and talk with her as she won't talk to him. 
Mallory told Feldman Sr. that he might have screwed up and broke some ribs, referring to 
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49
Charlene Mabie (Mallory). Feldman Sr. said he went downstairs to check on Charlene Mabie and 
opens the door and sees her lying down. He calls out her name and when he gets no response, he 
goes back upstairs. 
Feldman Sr. says that Mallory leaves the house and makes a phone call a short time later to 
Carl's phone asking if Feldman Sr. wanted to go to the bar. Around 45 minutes later Gary comes 
back to house where Carl, Amber, Feldman Sr. are sitting on the couch. Gary Mallory was acting 
very weird and intoxicated. 
Gary Mallory turned to Amber and said since no one had the balls to down and check her 
pulse, and asked Amber to do it. Amber went downstairs and came back up with a weird look on 
her face. Feld.man Sr. and Carl go downstairs and Carl moves her arm to check for a pulse and 
Charlene Mabie is stiff and cold. They go back upstairs. Feld.mans Sr. calls the police and and 
Gary ~allory goes back downstairs. 
Det Birdsell went to the scene and m~t Coroner Gary Gilliam at the scene. Det. Birdsell 
went to the Southeast bedroom in the basement where Charlene Mabie (Mallory) was laying on the 
bed. She was on her back with her right arm in a straight position and left arm slightly bent 
forward. By the look of Mabie it was obvious that she was deceased and rigor mortis had set in. 
On Mabie's neck there was bruising and scratch marks on the left side of the neck. There was a 
small amount of dried blood on the outer lips of Mabie, but no other visible signs of injury. There 
was a cell phone laying on the chest of Mabie that Officers said Mallory was using and left on her 
chest 
Cpl. George Hill interviewed Amber Taylor who advised that she came home this morning 
with her daughter. They entered through the basement and he daughter was trying to look into 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 5 
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Mallory's room. She told her daughter not to look into the room and be respectful. Amber then 
looked into the room and Gary Mallory was pressed up against the wall and Charlene Mabie was 
lying on the bed. She· said oh, I am sorry and went upstairs. Amber Taylor and Mallory had 
argument about Taylor's daughter's .manners and eating. Mallory th.en told Taylor that he should 
mind his manners and that he needed to mind bis manners and Taylor needed to go check her 
(Charlene Mabie's) pulse. Taylor then said ''you did not" and Mallory replied "you better go 
check it''. She went downstairs and called out Charlene's name 5 times and pulled down the 
blanket and Charlene didn't move. Taylor said she knew she was dead and went upstairs. Taylor 
came back upstairs Tim said "well" and Taylor replied ''yeah''. Mallory was holding a green duffel 
bag and kept asking for a ride. Mallory said "that is why I wanted a ride". Tim. then called the 
police. 
WHEREFORE, affiant asserts that there is probable cause as required by law for the 
issuance of the search warrant requested herein, and that th.ere is reasonable probable cause that the 
property sought as described herein is on the person or in the place to be searched as described 
. herein and, therefore, prays that a search warrant issue as requested directing a search for and 
seizure of the property hereinabove described. 
PE.R'<:,:l:H:::l'J:'4!.-J:t;;C.~ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1-fday of--<___.."?'-"7?'-'-(,?Q.=--1,-J-....7 at 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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Law Supplemental Narrative: 
Supplemental Narratives 
Seq Name Date Narrative 
33 Birdsell Brian 18:30:31 02/18/2009 
Lewiston Police Supplemental Narrative 
09-L2220 
Officer Birdsell, #332 
18 February 09 
Typed by: #366 
On 02-18-09 I inventoried the green duffel bag which was seized pursuant to a 
search warrant on 02-14-09 and taken from the living room area of 1835 7th 
Avenue. This would be the same green duffel bag that Gary Mallory came out of 
the basement carrying when he was asking Amber Taylor for a ride. 
The green duffel bag was emptied and inventoried. The duffel bag contained the 
following items: 
1) Contained 12 do-rags (bandana head coverings) 
2) Five pairs of white socks 
3) Six pairs of underwear 
4) Sixteen t-shirts 
5) Six tank tops 
6) One pair of black denim jeans 
7) One black and gold zip-up coat 
8) One blue, white and red flannel shirt 
9) One pair of black shorts and One pair of camo shorts 
10) One pair of jean shorts 
11) One small green canvas-type linen bag 
12) Two toothbrushes 
13) One stick of Old Spice High Endurance deodorant 
14) One roll of Ace bandage wrap. 
While looking at these items, I came across a blue Hells Canyon USA tank top 
shirt. On this shirt, there appeared to be two areas, one on the lower left 
corner and the left upper chest near the armpit area where there appeared to be 
blood stains. It is unknown if these blood stains are related to this incident, 
however this shirt was taken out of the green duffel bag and bagged separately. 
This shirt will be forwarded on to the Idaho State Forensic Lab for biological 
examination. 
All of the other clothing items were returned to the duffel bag and placed in 
to evidence. 
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In order for the Defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder, the State must 
prove th.at the murder: 
was a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. Premeditation means 
to consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill, and then to decide to 
kill. There does not have to be any appreciable period of time during 
which the decision to kill was considered, as long as it was reflected upon 
before the decision was made. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, 
even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditation. 
If you unanimously agree that the State has proven the above special circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant guilty of first degree murder. If 
you unanimoUply agree that the special circumstance has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant guilty of second degree murder. 
All other murder is murder in the second degree. 
n..rc<'T"OTTrTTnN~ SUB:MITTED TO THE JURY 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Gary Mallory 
#97013 
Idaho Correctional Center Unit H 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dear Gary: . 
October 4, 2011 
. Please find enclosed a copy of your opening brief on appeal. The state will now file an 
opposing brief and we will have an opportunity to file a reply brief. After that, the Court will 
issue a written decision. 
You will ~ee that I only raised one issue on appeal. Let me explain why I didn't raise 
other issues. In general, there must be a proper motion or objection and an adverse ruling before 
you can raise on issue on appeal. There were several examples in your case where there were 
possible issues, but where there was not an objection, a proper motion or there was a waiver of 
the issue. You should think about whether to raise these claims in a post-conviction petition. A 
post-conviction petition is different from an appeal because you can raise new issues and support 
your new issues with additional evidence. Here is a list of issues I couldn't raise on appeal: 
1. The court did not instruct the jury panel before voir dire that the death penalty was not 
an option in your case. Idaho Code § 18-4004A(2) requires the court to do so. Your attorney, 
however, did not object to the court's failure to do so. Between us, I'm not sure it made any 
difference in the voir dire and the court did give the jury the instruction at the end of the trial. 
2. The court did not order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing under tdaho 
Code§ 19-2523. There was no request that it do so. Again, I'm not sure that it made any 
difference in your sentence because it's not clear whether you needed an evaluation and you 
refused to participate in the psychological evaluation obtained by your first attorneys. 
3. It looks like your attorney had a conflict of interest because he represented Tim 
Feldman, Sr., at the same time he represented you. However, there was no objection to him 
representing you when he brought that to the court's attention. In case_s like this, where there is a 
potential conflict of interest but no objection, the defendant has to show that his attorney's 
performance was affected by the conflict. There is nothing in the trial record which shows that, 
but you might be able to develop the evidence in post-conviction. This is potentially a good 
issue in post-conviction. 
4. :rhe court denied your motion for continuance but your attorney never made a showing 
of what the missing witness would have testified to or what efforts he had made to try to find the 
:i.n:i. \Y! R,nnock • P.O. Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83701 • 208.343.1000 • Facsimile 208.345.8274 • www.nbmlaw.com 
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Gary Mallory 
October 4, 2011 
Page2 
witness. If you could prove that he could have found the witness and the witness would have 
been favorable to you, you could raise that on post-conviction. 
5. Your attorney waived your right to a speedy trial in your absence. However, you had 
earlier waived your right to a speedy trial in open court when you asked that your first attorneys 
be replaced. 
6. Your confidential psychological evaluation (where you refused to participate) 
somehow got into the record. It is not clear how that happened. Ifyour attorney turned it over 
that co_uld be part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
7. The trial court denied Mr. Cox's motion to withdraw. I couldn't raise this on appeal 
because you told the judge that it would be OK for Mr. Cox to continue to represent you. 
8. During the jury selection, the court denied your challenges to three potential jurors: 
Mill, Kimsey and Vaughn. Your attorney knocked off Mill and Vaughn, but the record doesn't 
show what happened to Kimsey. I'm not sure this makes any difference because Kimsey was not 
on the jury that rendered the verdicts. 
·9. The way impeachment was handled during trial was very confusing, but there was no 
request that the court give an instruction to the jury on how to handle that evidence. 
10. The Miranda issue should be raised in post-conviction. Mr. Cox did file a motion to 
suppress, but the court found that the motion was untimely (it was) and did not find good cause 
for the late filing. Without a finding of good cause to excuse the late filing, that issue would not 
prevail on appeal. In addition, Mr. Cox did not introduce the video of the interrogation at the 
time of the motion. So, the Court ruled on the motion without being able to review the video. 
Finally, the argument on the motion to suppress was that you asked for an attorney during the 19-
second gap in the recording. The Court found that you didn't and just accepted the prosecutor's 
representation that you did not ask for counsel until 1 :34:45 in the recording. Had your attorney 
played the entire recording for the court, the judge would have seen you mention or ask for an 
attorney at 1: 15:30; 1:17:50; 1:19:00; 1 :22:50; and 1 :31:30 (the times are approximate). This is 
another potentially strong issue in post-conviction. 
I suggest you start working on your post-conviction petition right away. You only have a 
year after the appeal is over to file that. I wil_l not be able to assist you in drafting the petition, 








ROBERT J. VAN !DOUR, ISBN 2644 
FITZGERALD & VAN IDOUR 
Atto~eys at Law 
111 Main Street, Suite 301 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-4090 
Facsimile: (208)746-5571 . · 
.-;~}-, ....... . 
FILED 
lli'9 ffB 18 Pi't t 3 q. 
. r!Jf ffltrnm Vv\__ 
· -~ .. DEPUTY . 
E-mail address: lcdefender@gwesto:ffice:net ·-~~- -· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 












Case No. CR2009-01472 
MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION 
OF PSYCillATRIST/PSYCHOLOGIST · 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
MOTION 
Defendant, by and through bis undersigned counsel, moves the Court to authorize the 
defense to retain a psychiatrist at the expense of the State. This Motion is based on Idaho· Code 
Section §19-852, the records and files of this case and the supporting Affidavit herein. 
Dated February 18, 2009 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO .. ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
Robert J. Van Idour, after first being duly sworn on oath, saY,s as follows: 
My firm has been appointed as defense counsel in the above entitled case. 
MOTION RE:PSYCHIATRlST; AFFIDAVIT 
K c.,\{ ·-. ._-. '.( / 




CERTIFICAIB OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on February 18, 2009 a true copy of this document was delivered to the law 
offices of the Prosecuting Attorney, 1109 F Street, Lewiston, ID 83501following via the method .· 
noted below: · 
V Sent via facsimile to facsimile number 799-3080 
Hand delivered via Valley Messengers 
Sent via postage prepaid U.S. Mail 
MOTION RE: PSYCHIATRIST; AFFIDAVIT 3 
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ROBERT J. VAN !DOUR, ISBN 2644 
FITZGERALD & VAN !DOUR - . - . 
Attorneys at Law 
111 Main Street. Suite 301 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6100 
Facsimile: (208) 746-5571 
e-mail address: lcdefender@qwestoffi.ce.net 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Plaintiff, 
V. 












Case No. CR2009-1472 
MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION 
OF PRN ATE INVESTIGATOR 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
MOTION 
Defend.ant, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves the Court to authorize the 
defense to retain a private investigator at the expense of the State. This Motion is based on Idaho 
Code Section§ 19-852, the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, the records and files of this case and the supporting Affidavit 
herein. 
Dated February 18, 2009 P\Ut\JJJ_ 
Robert J.1!!j !dour 
Defense C~el 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
MOTION RE:PRlV ATE INVESTIGATOR; 
AFFIDA~T 1 .. J c1-H10r1 t 
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Ro.bert J. Van !dour, after first being duly sworn on oa1ll; says as follows: 
My firm has been appointed as defense counsel in the above entitled case. 
The defendant in this case is Gary W. Mallory II. :Mr. Mallory is currently incarcerated 
on the charge in this case. 
The defense in this case is in need of the services of a private investigator. In addition to 
witnesses to be interviewed there are also potentially items of physical evidence to be examined 
and factual details to be investigated. 
Affi.ant is not a trained homicide investigator, nor has Affiant ever worked as a peace 
officer. It is Affiant' s belief that in ord~r to conduct a proper investigation the services of a 
private investigator with training in homicide investigations are n~ssary. Under Section 4.1 of 
the Guidelines for the Appoin1ment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 
an investigator is designated as part of the core defense team that is necessary for proper 
representation of defendants in capital cases. 
Further your a:ffiant sayeth not 
Dated February 18, 2009 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public of Idaho, this 18th day of 
February, 2009. 
MOT101'! RE:PRIV ATE INVESTIGATOR; 
AFFIDAVIT 2 
c;/m?YLJ2~4_ 
Notary Public ofldaho, residing at 
Lewisto~ therein. 




Robert J. Van !dour, ISBN 2644 
FITZGERALD & VAN IDOUR 
Attorneys at Law 
111 Main Street, Suite 301 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6100 
Facsimile: (208) 746-5571 
E-mail: lcdefender@qwestoffice.net 
Pt-~ ::D 
l.lm t=EB 18 ri'l 4 aLf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE-COND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE · 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintra: 
vs. 












Case No. CR2009-1472 
MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION 
OF PATHOLOGIST 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
MOTION 
_ Defendan~ by and through his undersigned counsel, moves the Court to authorize the 
defense to retain a forensic pathologist at the expense of the State. 1bis Motion is based on Idaho 
Code S~ction § 19-852, the records and files of this case and the supporting Affidavit herein. 
Dated February 18, 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 




Robert J. Van !dour, after first being duly sworn on oath, says as follows: 
My firm has been appointed as defense counsel in the above entitled case. 
•K,..,,...,....,......_r '1"'"' "TTTJUlRTZE RETENTION OF PATHOLOGIST- 1 of3 
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This procedure is especially appropriate in this case because: 
' ' .. 
A. The defend.ant is charged with first degree murder, the only Idaho crime 
carrying the potential of the death penalty. Without a separate resource 
judge, the same judge hearing fiscal matters ( and thus possibly becoming 
privy to unsuccessful defense forensic testing, for example) could determine 
the fate of the defendant. A similarly situated defendant with private 
resources would not have to reveal such privileged strategies to a Court. A 
similarly situated defendant with private resources is not forced to reveal to 
the sentencing judge privileged matters. 
B. The resource judge procedure has been commonly used in the past by courts 
in the Second Judicial District. 
Dated: February 17, 2009 
Robert J. V our 
Defense Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
b'-
I hereby certify that on February 6 2009 a true copy of this document was delivered to 
the law offices of the Prosecuting A m y, 1109 F Street, Lewiston, ID 8350 lfollowing via the 
method noted bcl.0w:· 
~ent via facsimile to facsimile number 799-3080 
Hand delivered via Valley Messengers 
Sent via postage prepaid U.S. Mail 
FITZGERALD & VAN !DOUR 





NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Attorney for Appellant 
i; 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 












GARY WAYNE MALLORY, 
Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
SECOND UNOPPOSED 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO FILE OPENING 
BRIEF 
Dennis Benjamin, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I am appointed counsel for the Appellant in the above-entitled case. 
3. That the Appellant's Opening Brief is due on September 13, 2011. 
4. Current counsel has made one other request for an extension of time. 
5. That pursuant to a standing agreement with the Attorney General's Office I am 
authorized to say that the Respondent does not object to this motion. 
6. That I have not been able to complete this brief due to the press of other matters. In 
particular, in the last four weeks I prepared for and participated in an evidentiary hearing in a 
1 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION 




first-degree murder post-conviction case and prepared for and participated in a sentencing 
hearing in a serious felony case. I was then out of the office for a week taking my only child to 
college. I became ill on that trip, missed two days of work and was not able to work at my 
normal rate for the rest of that week. I have also been working on a response to a motion for 
summary judgment in a federal habeas case. During this time, I also attended to the day-to-day 
requirements of approximately 25 other cases pending in the state and federal courts. 
7. That all efforts will be made to file the brief by the requested date. 
8. That the extension of time will permit me to submit a cogent presentation of the issues 
on appeal for the Court and permit me to afford my client the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
This ends my affidavit. 
L>.QA"'~~ , 
Dennis Benjamin 
2 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILil'JG 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this (-$~day of September, 2011, caused a true an,d 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
3 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION 




NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Attorney for Appellant 
' ' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 












GARY WAYNE MALLORY, 
Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
FILE OPENING BRIEF 
Dennis Benjamin, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I am appointed counsel for the Appellant in the above-entitled case. 
3. That the Appellant's Opening Brief is due on August 16, 2011. 
4. Current counsel has not made any other requests for an extension of time. 
5. That pursuant to a standing agreement with the Attorney General's Office I am 
authorized to say that the Respondent does not object to this motion. 
6. That I have not been able to complete this brief due to the press of other matters. In 
particular, last week I filed a reply brief in State v. Olson, No. 36749 and was occupied in 
1 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 




preparing a brief in a state post-conviction proceeding in a first-degree murder case which I filed 
only yesterday. In addition, I have been preparing for an evidentiary hearing in another first-
degree murder post-conviction case set later this week and in attending to the day-to-day 
requirements of approximately 25 other cases pending in the state and federal courts. 
7. That all efforts will be made to file the brief by the requested date. 
8. That the extension of time will permit me to submit a cogent presentation ofthe'issues 
on appeal for the Court and permit me to afford my client the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
This ends my affidavit. 
2 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE OPENING BRIEF 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this l~~y of August, 2011, caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
u~"-~"S_.c;.Ac-.,--
Dennis Benjamin l 
3 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
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Petitioner ;. .. PATii~IJi'Yl.~ 
IN 'f!IE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE S <;cc.,d. ~ll!lf/(I, DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A )e:z:.. ~e~c.e... 
•. 

















, Petitioner in the above 
entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections 
under the direct care, custody and control of Warden~C-o.._,,,,_c~l~~-~----------
of the ::t:Jo.h d CoN:ecA- io(I.CA\ Yo~i l+ulYc"' ~ Or..{; Ao• -
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner 
to properly pursue. Petitioner lacks the knowledge and skill needed to represent him/herself. 
3. Petitioner/Respondent required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she 
was unable to do it him/herself. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
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4. Other:_,_A/-=---,4....___ _______________ _ 
DATED this _J_l_ day of____,_A--'-1"-p_,_r_,_\ _\ _____ , 20 J3-: 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of Cle.c.<'wD;\cr ) 
Gary w. tf Q (( er-vJt: , after first being duly sworn upon his/her oath, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I am th~ Affiant in the above-entitled case; 
2. I am currently residing at the rd:::.t.V)c) Cc.() rec J-icv1Ct ( Tf) i/--J-dtcri o:f' 
O.r-f'it\O 
under the care, custody and control of Warden---l,,C..,,.4~/\----'-'-LTL:l'f_.__ _____ __: 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel; 
4. I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real 
property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly 
handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State; 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 





WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue 
it's Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to represent his/her interest, 
or in the alternative gr~nt any such relief to which it may appear the Petitioner is entitled to. 
DATED This _lJ_ day of__,_,k~..:..f'..,_, ._I _____ __;, 20 /3. 
of 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this lJ_ day 
~ill ,20~. · 
(SEAL) Notary Public 
Commission expires: -..:.:..e..1AA1J.1.~;/J /1 
! r-- . . -
' ·-
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S €vCAA c) ~·~ct'AL DISTRICT 
:, iiP\JTY 




















IT IS HEARBY ORDERE_D that the Petition~r's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel is granted and g,lk_ ~· hv (attorney's name), a duly 
I 
licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said defendant in 
all proceedings involving the post conviction petition. 
DATED this /Jf'aay of Ap/, 4 / , 20/1. - , 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
Revised I O/l 3/05 
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/ 
SECOND ~ICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE ~"'\IDAHO 
IN·-"',JD FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PER~.c,;; 
1230 MAIN ST. 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff FILED ) 
) Case No: CV-2013-0000763 
vs 
~ 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 




Thursday, May 16, 2013 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Courtroom # 1 
01:15 PM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in this 
office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on 
April 16th, 2013. 
Copy to: State ofldaho(Defendant),, MASTER-POST CONVICTION RELIEF,-.~~ 
Copy to: GaryWayneMalloryll(Subject), 3'81 W. ~fih--l ))(-. Dr0'1rio :rl'::) 13S"44 - M~l<J.... 
Copy to: Richard M Cuddihy P.O. Drawer 717, Lewiston, ID, 83501 (Subject Attorney). YN..SIS~t.,\,..,-" 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: 
By 
April 16th, 2013 
Patty 0. Weeks 





Gary Wayne Mallory II 
Full Name/Prisoner Name 
#97013 C1 ICIO 
381 w Hospital nri ve 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 9034 
Complete Maihng Address 
Plaintiff/Defendant 
( circle one) 
_,,..--~, 
l .. ,•t 
FILED 
2013 RPR 2.9 IIIJ 9 I.la 
. PAT~ f'_~[ 
·: !.¥Ff~~~-~~ 
-V ~f LDEPUTy .. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
Ga~y W. MaJJory II #97013 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, ---(Full name and prisoner number. 
. vs. 
State of r'ciaho 
Defendant/Respondent( s ), 













CASE NO. CV13 00763 
Motion and Affidavit 




COMES NOW,w. Mallory II @affiti~fefldant (circle one) in the above 
entitled matter, moving this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's 
Motion for Appointment of substitute conflict-Free counsel. 
Cause for this Motion are more fulJy set forth herein and 
in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for Appointment of 
Substitute Conflict-Free Counsel. 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the IDOC, 
Motion/Affidavit/Support of -1 
Appointment/Substitute Conflict-




\.: .. __ ,. 
in the custody of Warden Carlin at the Idaho Correctional 
Institution in Orofino. 
2. The legal issues in this matter are too complex 
for Petioner to adequately and properly pursue. This Court 
has appointed Counsel, for these reasons. An experienced, 
conflict-free attorney is needed to properly present these 
issues._J>etitioner requires assistance in completing all 
Motions and/or pleadings, in the interest of justice. 
3. Petitioner hereby asserts tbat a coofJjct exjsts with 
Mr. Rick Cuddihy, the counsel appointed by this Court on 
12 April, 2013. (Order Granting Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel.) 
Dated this J...6 day of April, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FoR· APPOINTMENT OF SUBSTITUTE CONFLICT 
FREE COUNSEL 
State of Idaho .;. 
County of Clearwater 








bis oath: deposes ana says as follows: 
1. I am the Affiant/Petitioner in the above entitled 
case. I am indigent and unable to hire counsel, of which 
the Court is aware. I reiterate all listed in the Affidavit 
In Support for Appointment of Counsel submitted to this 
Court 11 April 2013. 
2~-on 3 June 2010, during Affiant's Sentencing Hearing 
before this Honorable Court, testimony was given by Richard 
M. Cuddihy, for the State of Idaho, against the interests 
of Affiant/Petitioner. (Sentencing Transcript Pages 14-27.) 
3. Richard M. Cuddihy, as a witness for the state of 
Idaho, is not legally eligible to represent Affiant. This 
conflict is clearly established and violates Affiant's right 
to conflict-free Counsel. [Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 
1181 "Defendant has right under both Federal and State Cons-
titution to representation free from conflicts of interest.] 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amndmnt. 6 Const. Art. 1§13; [State v. Guzman 
126 Idaho 368,883 P.2d criminal Law Key site no. 641.5 (.S)] 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully prays that this 
Honorable court will Order the-granting of this motion. 
Conflict-free Counsel is necessary in this matter and is 
in the interest of justice. In the alternative, Petitioner 
prays this Honorable Court will grant any such relief to 
which it may appear Petitioner is entitled. . . 
Respectfully submitted this JJ....O day of;..__ __ A=p.a.;;..r=-1=-· l:;;:._ __ _:20 1 3. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .a:6.__ day of _=A=p=r=i=l ___ ___,,20 __u___, I 
Motion and Affidavit in Support 
mailedatrueandcorrectcopy.ofthe for Appointment of Substitute via 
Conflict-Free Counsel 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
1221 F Street, PO Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
·~.,;z:-
alainti ~ :Ccircle ~, 
Gary W. Mallory II 
Motion/Affidavit/Support ~t __ 
Appointment/Substitute Conflict-
Revised 10/24/05 
Page 4 of 4 
Free Counsel 
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May. 3. 2013 5:04PM 
Manderson L, Miles 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
Macken:i;ie J, Welch 
Owen L. Knowlton 
(19 IO • 1991) 
~\· 
Knowlton & Miles, PLLC 







FAX COVER SHEET 
********************************************************•******** 
FaxNo. Jqq- QDS"9) 
From /<,i GK UJdd.j h ~· - /:;_i) /et:¥! 
Re: ~I\Ol\lo\flr I/ Ski V 
Notes: 






ORIGINAL I COPY: 
Will not be sent 
Will be delivered/mailed upon your request 
Will be sent via U, S, Mail Service 
Will be delivered 
Will be filed with the Court 
Other: 
P. 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE - This facsimile transmission (and/or the documents accompanying ir) may 
contain confidential information belonging to the sender which is protected by the anorney-clienr privilege. The 
information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named. If you are not che intended recipient, you arc 
hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distributing or the taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this 
information is stdctly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, immediately no1ify us by te]epho11e to 
arrange for return of the documents. 
Phone: (208) 746-0103 Fax: (208) 746-0118 E-mail: kmkpllc@cableone.net 
312 Seventeenth Street, Lewiston, Idaho 8)501 
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Richard M, Cuddihy ISB No. 7064 
KNOWLTQN & MILES, PLLC 
Post Office Drawer 717 
312 Seventeenth Street 
Lewiston~ Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746.,0103 
Fax: (208) 746-0118 
ISBNo. 7064 
Attorneys for Defendant 
J-'0\ 
f ~ - .- . ~ 
., .,, ~··, -·· ~·-·--··-'. .- .· -· 
FlLE:O 
2011-• s am s ss 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY WAYNE MALLORY II, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No.: CV-13-763 
MOTION TO WITHDRA Vl 
COlvffiS NOW, the Defendant's appointed attorney ofrecord, Rick Cuddihy, of Knowlton 
& Miles, PLLC, and moves the Court for an Order allowing said attorney to v.r:ithdraw as appointed 
counsel f()r defendant, Gary Wayne Mallo1y II. 
This motion is s~orted by the attached Affidavit .. 
DATED this ,L day of May, 2013. 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 





:' , I 
84
, .M4J.y. 3. 2013 5:04PM No. 6970 P. 3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
.• . 2}Q, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisD __ day of May, 2013, I caus_ed a tme mid couec:,t copy 
of the foregoing Motion to Withdraw to be: 
D hand delivered 
0 hand delivered by providing a copy to: Messenger Service 
D mailed postage prepaid 
~ceitified mail 
-, faxed 
to the following: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
1109 F. St · 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
· Fax 799~3080 · 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Pagel 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC -
Richard M. Cuddihy 
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M1;y, 3. 2013 5:04PM 
Rick Cqddihy, ISB No, 7064 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
Post Office Drawer 717 
312 Seventeenth Street 
Lewiston. Idaho 83 50 I . 
Telephone: (208) 746-0103 
Fax: (208) 746-0118 
A.ttorneysfor])efendant 
No. 6970 · P. t] 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 











AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
.1,·ru:cK CUDDIHY, being first duly swom, upon his oath. deposes and says: 
1. I atn a couit~appointed conflict public defender representing the defendant in the o bovc-· 
entitled matter. 
2. I have a conflict as I testified for the State of Idaho against the Defendant. Gaiy Wayne 
Mallory II in his Nez Perce Counry Case No. CR09-1472. which is directly related this tbe above 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 

















3. Based on my previous testimony, I have a cor:rfl~uest an or~- to v;1jth\}Yf.t''i'!. 
... , i ii \ ~ ~'/ ! //~, 
J(!:l_ _,Y.·~~1~~1-~~··/\ 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WlTHDRA W 
Rick Cuddihy ) 
/_../ 
N P BLIC for Idaho; 
My Commission expires: /o-&-f 8 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
. -~ .. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this "?f' day of May, 2013, I caused a true anJ. coi-rcct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW to bo: 
D Han~ delivered by providing a copy to: Valley Messenger Service 
0 Mailed postage prepaid 
[] Ce11ified mail 
~·Faxed 
O Hand delivered 
to the follovvfog: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
1109 F. St 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax 799-3080 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
.,. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF I~AHO, IN AND FOR THE C<;)-µNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY WAYNE MALLORY II, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL 
r. 7 
The Court having read and passed upon the foregoing Motion and Affidavit in Sup1,ni:t nnd 
being advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw as attorney in the above-entitled 
matteris granted. 
DAT:ED this £day of May, 20.13. 
Judge 
ORDEll OF WITHDRAWAL 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
IlIEREBYCERTIFYthaton this~dayoflvfay, 2013, I caused a trne and corrcctc.01,:.-· 
of the foregoing Order to Withdraw to be: 
[ ] hand delivered 
[ ] hand delivered by providing a copy to: Messenger Service 
[ ] mailed postage prepaid 
[ ] certified mail 
Jd'faxed 
to the follovving: 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 i 71h Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
1109F. St 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Gary Wayne Mallozy II #97013 -rno.-c.·(~ 
381 W. Hospital Dtive 
Orofino, ID 83544 





















SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDABOFJlED 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
LEwiii~N~ci· 83501 llB:111 8 Pft, 12 JI 
Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff 
vs 
State Ofldaho, Defendant 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 
Kwate Law Office 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston ID 83501 







Case,··· >cv-20,J~763 . 
ORDER APPOINTING 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Public Defender for the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the 
State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said Petitioner, Gary W. Mallory II, in all 
proceedings in the above entitled case. 
The Petitioner is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or 
part of the cost of court appointed counsel. · 











Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 799-3073 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY II, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CV2013-0000763 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR HEARING 
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record, 
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and moves 
this Court for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petitioner's Application for Post-
Conviction Relief as it presents no genuine issue of material fact and the Respondent is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c ). 
Further, that this matter be set for hearing at a time convenient for the Court. 
DATED this ~y of May, 2013. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSTION 
AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR HEARING 1 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR 
HEARING was 
(1) __ hand delivered, or 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ s~nt via facsimile, or 
( 4) 7mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Gary w. Mallory II 
LC.LO. Unit C-1 
381 W. Hospital Drive 
Orofino, ID 83544 
DATED this !ff' day of May, 2013 .. 
MOTION FOR SUM:MARY DISPOSTION 







Gary Wayne M~llory Il,Plaintiff vs State Ofldaho, Defendant 
, Hearillgtype: Status/Scheduling Conference 
, :J:learing date: 5/16/2013 
Time: 1:25 pm 
Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Courtroom: 1 
Coµrt reporter: Nancy Towler 
' Minutes Clerk: TERESA 




12500 Petitioner not present (incarcerated DepartmentofCorrections). Mr. 
Coleman addresses the Court artdMr. Hum is requesting a 2 week continuance because he 






Court addresses counset 
Mr. Hum addresses the Court 
. ' - . 
Court sets another status conference for 5-30-13 at 1:15 p.m. 
Court recess. · 
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Gregory R. Hurn 
K wate Law Offices, PLLC 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: 208-746-7060 
Fax:208-746-2660 
Idaho State Bar# 8753 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CV 2013-00763 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 
COMES NOW the defendant, Gary W. Mallory, by and through the defendant's attorney of 
record, Gregory R. Hurn, of K wate Law Offices, PLLC, and moves the Court for an order 
transporting the defendant from Idaho Department of Corrections in Orofino, Idaho, to the Nez Perce 
County Jail, in Lewiston, Idaho. 
This motion is made for the reason that the attorney for the defendant needs to meet with the 
defendant in person to discuss his Post Conviction Relief. 
MOTION FOR TRANSPORT 1 
f. .h \• OR\G\l\\ r\ \ ,\tl"\Lc• 
95
,~1· 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2013. 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 




_£_ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight mail 
to the following: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
KWATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 







Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Ofldaho, Defendant 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 5/30/20f3 
. Time: 1:15 pm 
Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
. Tape:Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hurn 
April Smith 
Petitioner not presenf(incarcerated Department of Corrections). 
Court addresses counsel. Mr. Hurn has filed a motion for transport. 
Mr. Hurn addresses the Court re: motion for transport. 
11816 Court sets status conference for 6-27-13 at 1:15 p.m .. Court will enter 
- transport order for the 1st week of June and return the znd week ofJune. 
11920 Court recess. 
Court Minutes (] 
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CASE NO. CV13-00763 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT 
The defendant having been committed to the Idaho State Board of Corrections at 
Orofino, Idaho; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant be returned to Nez Perce County on 
June 3, 2013 for a ONE (1) week period to meet with his attorney re: Post Conviction Relief. 
Defendant shall be returned to the Department of Correction after that ONE (1) week period. 
ii'? ,1-
DATED this ·.:, I day of May, 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby ce1iify that a true copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR TRANSPORT was 
mailed, postage prepaid,_hy the undersigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, this~ day of May, 2013, 
on: 
Nez Perce County-emailed to Kelsey Felton 
Sheriff Department 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Greg Hum 
15 02 G Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
IDOC Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Beth Purdy 
IDOC-faxed to: (208) 327-7444 
Gary W. Mallory, II #97013 -~ .. f...tJ__ 
I.C.I.-0. Unit C-1 
Orofino ID 83544 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK 
B{]j1.<;~rv,----\_ ~ 
Deputy 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT 2 
99
F\LED 
w JlJ4 6 API 10 61 
,: E PATTY ~~m Ylf'--. 
~EPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, II, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














ORDER FOR TRANSPORT 
The defendant having been committed to the Idaho State Board of Corrections at 
Orofino, Idaho; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department of Corrections transport the 
defendant to Nez Perce County on June 10, 2013 for a ONE (1) week period to meet with his 
attorney re: Post Conviction Relief. Defendant shall be returned to the Department of Correction 
after that ONE (1) week period. 
DATED this !Jf-1.... day of June, 2013. 
RKERRICK - District Judge 
AMENDED 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED ORDER FOR 
TRANSPORT was mailed, postage prepaid, 
by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 
,Stuay of June, 2013, on: 
Nez Perce County-emailed to Kelsey Felton 
Sheriff Department 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Greg Hum 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
IDOC Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
Beth Purdy 
IDOC-faxed to: (208) 327-7444 
Gary W. Mallory, II #97013 
I.C.I.-0. Unit C-1 
Orofino ID 83544 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK 
By 
AMENDED 











Gary WayneMalloryH, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Hearing type: S~tus Conference 
l:I~aringdate:6/27 /2013 
Time:1:22pm 
Judge: Carl B. _Kerrick 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter:Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA -




Petitioner not present (incarcerated Department of Corrections). 
Court addresses Mr. Huri 
- -
Mr. Hurn addresses ~e-Court and will be filing an Amended Petition within 2 







Gary Wayne Miq6fy II; Pl_aintiff vs State Of Idaho, u.e1r~:p:1aar:tt 
T)H¢aring,t:ype:$tatus Conference 
\(~~~gdate: 7/11/2013 
..... -.- thne: 11:01 am 




Petitioner ~o(pre$ent{incarcerated Department 
Court addresses Mr}H:urn. .- .. 
}_.... ·,.::·.-.\._ - : . 
110135 Mr: Hurn ad,~~s~e{the Court He finished the ....... .u . -.. ....,, ....... "',!"''".,...,.,..,,,. .... 
received additional materi~lffo1n'Mt, Mallory (30 pages} and he 
discuss with his client befotf ptoceedjI1g. · 
110205 
110248 
Court sets ari&th~rsta.fu_s conference for 8-iS-13 
. . . . 
and 










Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 799-3073 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE, SECOND)UDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE.COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
CASE NO. CV2013-0000763 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 













In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of one count of Murder in the First Degree, and One . 
count of Felony Domestic Battery. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison with twenty eight 
(28) years fixed for Murd~i:~ and two (2) years for Domestic Battery, both sentences to run 
concurrently. Petitioner ~ppealed, in 2010, to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed his 
conviction in 2012. Petitioner then applied to the Idaho Supreme Court for review, which was 
denied. 
Brief in Support of 




Petitioner initiated these Post-conviction Relief proceedings on April 11, 2013, 
requesting vacation and dismissal, with prejudice, of his underlying convictions. The State filed 
a Motion for Summary Dismissal on May 1"6, 2013. This Court granted Petitioner leave to 
amend the petition on or about June 27, 2013. To date, the State has not seen an amended 
petition and wishes to move forward. The Motion for Summary Dismissal currently before the 
court, and this brief in support of that motion, are in response to that petition. 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a crime may 
seek relief by making one of the following claims: 
the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States, The Constitution or laws of this state; or 
the court did not have jurisdiction to impose sentence; or 
the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or 
there. is material evidence that requires the conviction or sentence to be vacated; or 
probation was unlawfully revoked or sentence expired; 
he was proven innocent; or 
the conviction is subject to collateral attack based on error. 
LC. § 19-4901(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief allows a person to challenge the validity of his 
conviction or sentence when all other processes of review have been tried or expired. The 
purpose of the petition is to "cure fundamental errors" that occurred at trial and affected 
jurisdiction of the court or the "validity of the judgment." Hall v. State, 126 Idaho 449, 541 (Ct. 
App. 1994). A petition is not meant to dispute issues that could be should have been brought on 
direct appeal. I. C. § 19-4901 (b ). Petitions for post-conviction relief stem from criminal 
convictions, but largely imitate civil proceedings. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 
Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary 
Dismissal 2 
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P.2d 642,644 (Ct.App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action, an application for post-
conviction relief must prove the facts of any allegation by attaching affidavits, records or other 
evidence, or, if unavailable, the application must state why such supporting evidence is nqt 
included. I.C. § 19-4903. 
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906 is the procedural 
equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in that the Petitioner 
bears the burden of proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. Martinez v. State, q}tdaho 844, 846 
875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct.App. 1994). 
Under I.C. §19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief may 
occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, "[s]ummary dismissal 
is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief." 
Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287,912 P.2d at 655. "If the application raises material issues of 
fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on 
each issue." Sanchez, 128 Idaho at 711, 905 P.2d at 644. 
Petitions that do not meet the above requirements may be summarily dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner submits a twenty-eight page petition for post-conviction relief without making 
a single factually supported allegation. He attempts, and fails, to meet the statutory requirements 
under I.C. 19-4903, with disorganized and haphazardly attached documents and photos. Nothing 
submitted with the petitioner's application gives factual support to any claim alleged. The 
petitioner has not met the required burden of pleading by proving, by preponderance of the 
Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary 
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evidence, any facts necessary to establish a claim for relief. Thus this application fails the 
requirements ofl.C. 19-4903, and therefore, should be summarily dismissed. 
I. PETITIONER RECEIVED ADEQUATE APPELATE COUNSEL 
BECAUSE ms COUNSEL ACTED REASONABLY AND DID NOT 
PREJUDICE THE PETITIONER. 
Petitioner alleges ineffectiveness of counsel based upon the failure of appellate counsel to 
follow the recommendations of Petitioner. These claims include failing to address an alleged 
Miranda violation and failure to bring an appeal on jury instructions. Further Petitioner alleges 
that his counsel should have "combed" the record more effectively and disallowed the State to 
file their "response" in the manner allowed by the court. 
A valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim proves that counsel's conduct was 
deficient and that deficient conduct prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. 
Conduct is deficient when it falls below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-
88. Deficient conduct becomes prejudicial when it "undermines the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process" such that the trial did not produce "a just result." Id. However, strategic 
decisions by counsel that are not the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or· 
other shortcomings cannot be evidence of ineffective counsel. State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181 
(1978). 
Petitioner alleges, in subsection (A), that his appellant counsel should have raised 
Miranda issues on appeal. While petitioner attached a letter from his attorney, petitioner's 
exhibit 7, this letter states only issues that that the attorney is choosing not to raise on appeal, and 
gives each a reason for not doing so. 
Brief in Support of 
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The choice of how to proceed on appeal is a strategic decision made by a petitioner's 
attorney. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. In petitioner's exhibit 7, appellant counsel explains why he 
is not pursuing each action, which shows proper preparation for appeal as well as adequate and 
appropriate knowledge of the law. Because ineffective counsel claims cannot be based on 
strategic decisions by counsel under Strickland, these claims should be dismissed. 
Petitioner further alleges, in subsections (B) through (E), a list of allegations that are 
unsupported by facts or evidence, and which are not verified by any attached affidavits, records, 
or other evidence. Because no allegations or documents are included to support these claims, 
and there is no explanation as to why these documents are absent, these claims also fail the 
requirements of LC. 19-4903 and should, therefore, be dismissed. 
II. PETITIONER RECEIVED ADEQUATE TRIAL COUNSEL BECAUSE 
HIS COUNSEL ACTED REASONABLY AND DID NOT PREJUDICE THE 
PETITIONER 
Petitioner claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of trial counsel and asserts a large 
list of supposed "failings." While Petitioner presents many hypothetical outcomes, he fails to 
provide any factual evidence to support these claims. Further Petitioner fails to address why this 
evidence is not included. 
A valid ineffective assistance of counsel shows that counsel's conduct was deficient and 
that deficient conduct prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Claims of 
ineffectiveness of council generally require that the petitioner affirmatively prove prejudice. Id, 
at 2067. Even if petitioner proves that particular errors were unreasonable and deficient conduct, 
the petitioner must also prove that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. Id. 
Brief in Support of 
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Petitioner alleges, in subsections (A) through (L ), claims without factual or material 
support. Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that errors made at trial are objectively 
unreasonable and that these errors had an adverse effect on the defense. Without providing such 
documentation, Petitioner's application is insufficient under LC. 19-4903 and fails under 
Strickland analysis. Therefore, these claims should be dismissed. 
ID. PETITIONER FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY FACTS TO SUPPORT 
ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT. 
Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor acted contrary to Petitioner's constitutional rights by 
meeting with defense counsel and the district judge in regard to his case. Petitioner further alleges that 
evidence presented by the prosecutor had been modified and misclassified with regard to Petitioner's 
interview recording and regarding scratches on Petitioners back. These allegations are accompanied by 
- . 
several theories, but no recognizable evidence. 
An applicant must allege, and then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary 
to establish his claim for relief. Martinez, 126 Idaho 844. Petitioner's claim is facially deficient from any 
articulable facts. While several documents are attached with his claim, there are no references to these 
documents and no direction as to how they might provide facts backing his arguments. Because 
Petitioner fails to provide the facts necessary to make an informed decision on his allegation, his 
application fails the .requirements of Martinez and should, therefore, be dismissed. 
IV. PETITIONER FAILS TO PROCIDE ANY FACTS TO SUPPORT 
ALLEGATIONS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Petitioner claims, through a series of alleged occurrences, that judicial misconduct occurred 
throughout his trial. These allegations include a variety of motions that allegedly went undecided. These 
Brief in Support of 
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motions are neither attached, nor are transcript portions provided to establish the existence of oral 
motions_. 
A petitioner's application for relief must be submitted with attached affidavits, records, or other 
evidence to provide factual backing of the al.legations made. I.C. 19-4903. In lieu of these attachments, 
I.C. 19-4903 allows a petitioner to make a statement regarding the documents absence. Without any facts 
to establish the handling of these motions, and without the motions themselves or a copy of the transcript 
establishing their existence, a factual conclusion cannot be made. Since no affidavits, records, or other 
evidence is attached, and no explanation is given for the lack of this information, Petitioner's application 
is insufficient under I.C. 19-4903 and should therefore be dismissed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Petitioner fails to raise any valid claims for Post-conviction Relief and does not raise any 
material issues of fact. Therefore, Petitioner's claim should be summarily dismissed in 
accordance with Idaho Code§ 19-4906. 
DATED this ~ay of August, 2013. 
Brief in Support of 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSAL, was: 
. 
(1) ~and delivered, or ~ 
(2) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(2) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United States 
mail, addressed to the following: 
Greg Hurn - \J.i.ou Yr?~-
K wate Law Office 
. 1502 G Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this s4-' day of August 2013. 
Brief in Support of 





Gregory R. Hum 
K wate Law Offices, PLLC 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-7060 
Fax: (208) 746-2660 
Idaho State Bar# 8753 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
Gary W. Mallory, II, ) Case No. CV 13-00763 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) AMENDED PETITION FOR 
vs. ) . POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, the petitioner, Gary W. Mallory, II, by and through his attorney ofrecord, 
Gregory R. Hurn of Kwate Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby files an amended petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1. The petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Institution at Orofino 
(ICIO), under the custody and care of Warden Tamera Carlin; 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
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2. The petitioner was convicted and found guilty at trial by a jury on March 17th, 2010, 
in Nez Perce County Case CR 2009-0172, of Murder in the First Degree, Idaho Code § 18-4001, 18-
4002, and 18-4003, and Domestic Battery §18-918 (2) (a) and 18-903 (a); 
3. The court which presided over the trial and imposed the sentence with respect to this 
amended petition is the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and 
for the County of Nez Perce, Honorable Carl B. Kerrick; 
4. The petitioner was sentenced in case CR 2009-0172 on June 3rd, 2010; 
5. The court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-eight (28) years to life for Murder 
in the First Degree and two (2) years for Domestic Battery to run consecutively. 
6. The petitioner appealed from the judgment of conviction and imposition of the 
sentence on June 7th, 2010; 
7. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's conviction on January 3rd, 
2012; 
8. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Idaho Supreme Court on April 
25th, 2012; 
9. The Idaho Supreme Court denied petitioner's Petition for Review on May 22nd, 2012; 
10. The Idaho Court of Appeals issued a remittur on May 22nd, 2012; 
11. All grounds upon which the amended petition is based are as follows: 
a. Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not 
litigating, on appeal, that statements made by the petitioner during the 
interrogation, that were used against him at trial, should have been 
suppressed because that evidence was obtained in violation of 
petitioner's constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 
436 (1966), when the interrogation continued after petitioner 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 





AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
requested to have counsel present. Appellate counsel's performance 
was deficient in that he did not litigate this matter despite petitioner 
wanting this litigated. This omission creates a reasonable probability 
that but for appellate counsel's omission the result of the appeal 
would have been different. This deficient performance therefore 
prejudiced petitioner from being granted the relief sought in 
petitioner's appeal. 
Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not 
litigating, on appeal, that the District Court erred in precluding the 
defense from introducing "alternate perpetrator" argument and 
evidence in support of such a defense. Appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient in that he did not litigate this matter 
despite petitioner wanting this litigated. This omission creates a 
reasonable probability that but for appellate counsel's omission the 
result of the appeal would have been different. This deficient 
performance therefore prejudiced petitioner from being granted the 
relief sought in petitioner's appeal. 
Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not 
litigating, on appeal, that the District Court erred in precluding the 
defense from arguing for a lesser jury instruction for a lesser included 
offense of manslaughter. Appellate counsel's performance was 
deficient in that he did not litigate this matter despite petitioner 
wanting this litigated. This omission creates a reasonable probability 
that but for appellate counsel's omission the result of the appeal 
would have been different. This deficient performance therefore 
prejudiced petitioner's from being granted the relief sought in 
petitioner's appeal. 
Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not 
fully investigating the record and litigating those irregularities that 
occurred before and during the trial in petitioner's criminal case with 
regards to petitioner's constitution rights to a "fair trial" and 
"competent trial proceedings". Appellate counsel's performance was 
deficient in that he did not investigate this matter in preparing 
petitioner's appeal. This omission creates a reasonable probability 
that but for appellate counsel's omission the result of the appeal 
would have been different had appellate counsel investigated and 
appealed irregularities in petitioner's representation by trial counsel. 
This deficient performance therefore prejudiced petitioner's from 








AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not personally investigating the crime scene prior to trial. By not 
investigating the crime scene, counsel's performance was deficient in 
that he did not adequately investigate and prepare for trial. This 
omission was not objectively reasonable and therefore creates a 
reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's omission the result 
of the trial would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not reviewing private investigator John Shrader's report with 
petitioner so that petitioner could help aid in his own defense. By 
not sharing or discussing the report with the petitioner, counsel's 
performance was deficient in that he did not adequately prepare for 
trial by allowing petitioner to aid in his own defense. This omission 
was not objectively reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable 
probability that but for trial counsel's omission the result of the trial 
would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Bob Van Idour, provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by not filing a motion to prevent the cremation of the victim's 
body before petitioner had the opportunity to an independent 
pathologist's examination as part of petitioner's preparation for trial 
and potential defense regarding the cause of death of the victim. By 
not pursuing the prevention of cremation, counsel's performance was 
deficient in that this led to petitioner being unable to have an 
independent pathological examination conducted in aid of his 
defense. This omission was not objectively reasonable and therefore 
creates a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's omission 
the result of the trial would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
because he was not adequately educated in the field of forensic 
pathology and was therefore unable to adequately cross-examine the 
state's witness at trial. Trial counsel in not acquiring the necessary 
education and/or knowledge regarding pathology was deficient in that 
this led to an inadequate cross-examination of the state's pathologist 
and the pathologist's report. This was not objectively reasonable and 
therefore creates a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's 
error the result of the trial would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
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POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Trial counsel did not talk with nor investigate several material 
witnesses that petitioner provided to trial counsel that would have 
presented testimony in contradiction to the state's theory and state 
witness' testimony. Those witnesses included Kathy Owens, Peggy 
Mallory, Patrina McMasters, Terry Biler, , Wes Hardy, Brandy 
Sander and Debra Shelman. Additionally, trial counsel failed to 
investigate any information provided to him by petitioner during the 
entire course of representation. In not investigating those witnesses, 
trial counsel's performance was deficient in that he did not adequately 
investigate and prepare for trial. This omission was not objectively 
reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable probability that but for 
trial counsel's omission the result of the trial would have been 
different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not consulting with the petitioner during the preparation for trial. 
Specifically trial counsel failed to discuss any specific trial strategy 
or defense with the petitioner at any time during representation. This 
prevented the petitioner from aiding in his own defense. By not 
discussing this discovery material with petitioner, trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that he did not adequately investigate 
and prepare for trial by having petitioner aid in his own defense. This 
omission was not objectively reasonable and therefore creates a 
reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's omission the result 
of the trial would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not conducting discovery of Wes Hardy by interviewing him as a 
potential material witness and/or suspect to the alleged crime despite 
petitioner informing trial counsel of the witnesses exculpatory value. 
By not investigating this witness prior to trial, trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that he did not adequately investigate 
and prepare for trial. This omission was not objectively reasonable 
and therefore creates a reasonable probability that but for trial 
counsel's omission the result of the trial would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not fully litigating and presenting to the District Court evidence of 
statements made by the defendant during police interrogation should · 
be suppressed in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment Rights. 
Specifically, trial counsel did not argue nor present the entire police 
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asked for counsel at a much earlier part in the interrogation th.an the 
prosecutor placed on the record. By not presenting the entire 
interrogation video to the Court at the suppression hearing and 
specifically pointing out early times where petitioner requested 
counsel, th.us displaying to the Court petitioner's request for counsel 
during earlier stages of the interrogation than the prosecution stated, 
trial counsel's performance was deficient. This error was not 
objectively reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable probability 
th.at but for trial counsel's omission the result of the trial would have 
been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, and Co-Counsel, Thomas Clark Jr., provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel because they were unqualified to 
litigate a capital case. By not being qualified to litigate a death 
penalty case, trial counsel's performance was deficient. This error 
was not objectively reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable 
probability th.at but for trial counsel's omission the result of the trial 
would have been different. 
n. Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not informing petitioner of the purpose or results of in-chamber 
discussions between the prosecuting attorney, trial counsel, and the 
Court. Petitioner therefore was unable to assist in his own defense 
with regards to these hearings and their impact on the defense of his 
case. By not discussing the purpose or results of in-chamber 
discussions , trial counsel's performance was deficient as it prevented 
petitioner from aiding in his own defense. This error was not 
objectively reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable probability 
that but for trial counsel's omission the result of the trial would have 
been different. 
o. Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not fully litigating exculpatory evidence displaying petitioner's body 
without any scratch marks at the beginning of the recorded 
interrogation which would have contradicted the state's theory th.at 
petitioner had mark's on his body before the interview that were a 
result of a struggle with the victim. By not fully litigating this issue, 
trial counsel's performance was deficient. This error was not 
objectively reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable probability 
that but for trial counsel's omission the result of the trial would have 
been different. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
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Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not disclosing on the record, a conflict of interest in representing 
petitioner and trial counsel's familial relationship with state witness, 
Amber Taylor. Furthermore trial counsel was ineffective by not 
withdrawing as petitioner's attorney of record based upon this conflict 
of interest. By not fully disclosing this conflict and seeking to 
withdraw, trial counsel's performance was deficient. This omission 
was not objectively reasonable and therefore creates a reasonable 
probability that but for trial counsel's omission the result of the trial 
would have been different. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not litigating petitioner's Fourth ( 4th) Amendment Right was violated 
through Officer Birdsell's search and seizure of contents of a duffle 
bag which were not listed in the search warrant. By not litigating this 
issue, evidence that illegally obtained was used at trial against 
petitioner. Therefore trial counsel's performance was deficient. This 
omission was not objectively reasonable and therefore creates a 
reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's omission the result 
of the trial would have been different had this evidence not been 
permitted to be used at trial. 
Trial counsel, Neil Cox, provided ineffective assistance of counsel on 
October 23rd, 2009, by not explaining, before or during the hearing 
on that date, what petitioner's rights were regarding the right to a 
speedy trial. As a result, petitioner right to a speedy trial were waived 
without petitioner's informed consent. By not explaining to 
petitioner, his speedy trial right, trial counsel's performance was 
deficient. This error was not objectively reasonable and therefore 
creates a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's omission 
the result of the trial would have been different because petitioner's 
waiver of a speedy trial would not have occurred and the case would 
have been dismissed for that reason. 
The prosecuting· attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct -by 
redacting portions of the recorded interrogation of the petitioner by 
law enforcement that would have further evidenced petitioner's 
request for counsel at a much earlier stage in the interrogation of the 
petitioner and therefore supported petitioner's motion to suppress 
statements made during the interrogation in violation of petitioner's 
constitutional rights. Furthermore the prosecutor committed 
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misrepresented to the Court the time when petitioner first requested 
the presence of counsel during his interrogation. Vowels represented 
to the court that petitioner asked for counsel at 1 :34:45 in the 
recording when in fact petitioner asked for counsel at 1:15:30, 
1:17:50, 1:19:00, 1:22:50, and 1:31:30 (approximately). By not 
disclosing the earlier requests by petitioner before the 1 :34:45 
request, the prosecutor committed misconduct. This error creates a 
reasonable probability that but for the prosecutor's misconduct, the 
evidence would have been suppressed and the result of the trial would 
have been different. 
The prosecuting attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by 
presenting testimony from witness Larry Shafer which was known to 
be false by the prosecuting attorney based upon known potential 
testimony from other witnesses, Kathy Owens, Debra Ann Shelman, 
and Margaret Mallory, in direct contradiction to Shafer's testimony. 
These wi1nesses and their testimony were known to the prosecution. 
This error creates a reasonable probability that but for the 
prosecutor's misconduct, the testimony of Larry Shafer would have 
been tested as to credibility and veracity would have led the jury to 
discredit his testimony and the result of the trial would have been 
different. 
The Court violated petitioner's constitutional rights to a fair trial by 
not ruling on petitioner's Motion to Authorize the Retention of a 
Pathologist, filed on February 18th, 2009, and not decided on until 
August, 2009. In not making a decision to grant or deny this motion 
until several months after the motion was made, the victim's body 
was cremated. Therefore petitioner was prevented from having an 
independent examination to subject the state's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing in preparation for his defense and trial. Such error 
if ruled on prior to the cremation could have led to a different result 
at trial if petitioner had an opportunity to have an expert examine the 
victim's body. 
The Court violated petitioner's constitutional rights to a fair trial by 
not granting petitioner's Motion to Retain a Private Investigator, until 
six ( 6) months after petitioner's motion. The result of not ruling on 
the motion in a timely manner was potential evidence was 
lost/ changed, potential wi1nesses memories of events were lost. Such 
error prevented petitioner from receiving due process oflaw and a fair 
and just result in his case. 
8 
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w. The Court violated petitioner's constitutional rights to a fair trial by 
not granting petitioner's request for a continuance on February 17, 
2010, for the purpose of locating and investigating witness, Wes 
Hardy. 
x. That the aforementioned combination of errors by defense counsel, 
even if individually harmless, require relief based upon the 
cumulative error doctrine. 
12. Petitioner did proceed in forma pauperis and this matter is being handled by 
appointed counsel; 
13. Relief requested by the petitioner is, in the alternative: (1) vacating of the conviction 
and dismissal of the charges; (2) negating the underlying sentence; (3) an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the validity of each claim that the petitioner has presented in this petition; (4) grant 
whatever else this Court deems appropriate in this matter, in order to rectify the Constitutional 
violations that petitioner has suffered, because of the acts, and/or failure (s) to act, by court appointed 
counsel in this matter. 
This Amended Petition is also supported by the Affidavit of Petitioner submitted in support 
herewith and copies of the attachments that were attached to Petitioner's original Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
DATED this L!i_ day of August, 2013. 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~y of August, 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
. . for~going in~trument was: 
Mailed 
Faxed 
__b Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight mail 
to the following; 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
AMENDED PEmION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Byb1[;}: g~ 
Gregory R. Hum 
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Name Date Narrative 
Birdsell Brian 01:48:26 02/20/2009 
) 
_) 
Lewiston Police Supplemental Narrative 
09-L2220 
Detective Birdsell, #332 
20 February 09 
.Typed by: #366 
On 02-18-09 I went to District.Judge Jeff Brudie's office along with Sgt. 
Arneson. We were there to do search warrant returns on the warrant for the 
evidence taken from Gary Mallory as well as the evidence taken from 1835 7th 
Avenue and th'? 810 pickup. 
While Sgt. Arne~on was filing his search warrant return for the evidence taken 
from Gary Mallory, I reviewed the paperwork for the warrant I had served on 
1835 7th Avenue as well as the pickup stored at the LPD storage unit. While 
reviewing this paperwork,"""'! noticed that on the search wc:i.rrant, ~he information 
regarding the property referred to and consists of was missing from the search 
warrant. It appears that while I was.typing this warrant, I had copied and 
pasted the information from the affidavit over to the search warrant. While 
doing this, somehow the property referred to and consists of section of the 
warrant was omitted. This was not done intentionally and was a clerical error 
on my part. 
I brought this information to the attention of Judge Brudie and stated there 
was an error on the search warrant. ·Judge Brudie then suggested I contact the 
:NJ?C Prosecutors office regarding this error. 
I made contact with Prosecutor Mia Vowels and advised her of the error for the 
search warrant. We reviewed the search warrant and found that all of the 
information regarding the place to be searched was correct and accurate, 
however the property referred to was missing from the search warrant. There was 
no difference in the wording between the search warrant and affidavit regarding 
the place to be searched, however what we were searching for was missing. Upon 
looking at the affidavit, I found that the search warrant return contained the 
exact property which we had listed in the affidavit, .but it was missing from 
the search warrant. When I served the.search warrant on the residence, ·I had 
the affidavit wit~ me and had read this as well, however missed that it was 
missing from the search warrant. 
On 02-19-09 I responded back to Judge Brudie 1 s chambers and at that time I 
filed the search warrant return with the error in the search warrant. He signed 
an order to hold the evidence at LPD as well as the search warrant returns. 
End of report 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Gary Mallory 
#97013 
Idaho Co1Tectional Center Unit H 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
Dear Gary: 
October 4, 2011 
Please fmd enclosed a copy of your opening brief on appeal. The state will now file an 
opposing brief and we will have an opportunity to file a reply brief. After that, the Court will 
issue a written decision. 
You will :;ee that I only raised one issue on appeal. Let me explain why I didn't raise 
other issues. In general, there must be a proper motion or objection and an adverse ruling before 
you can raise on issue on appeal. There were several examples in your case where there were 
possible-1.ssues; but-where there was not.an-objection, a proper motion or thexe w~s l:l-WfilYer_o_f 
-, the issue. You should th.ink about whether to raise these claims in a post-conviction petition. A 
· - _) post-conviction petition is different from an appeal because you can raise new issues and support 
your new issues with additional evidence. Here is a list of issues I couldn't raise on appeal: 
) 
-J 
1. The court did not instruct the jury panel before voir dire that the death penalty was not 
an option in your case. Idaho Code § l.8-4004A(2) requires the court to do so. Your attorney, 
however, did not object to the court's failure to do so. Between us, I'm not sure it made any 
difference in the voir dire and the court did give the jury the instruction at the end of the trial 
2. The court did not order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing under °Idaho 
Code § 19-2523. There was no request that it do so. Again, I'm not sure that it made any · 
difference in your sentence because it's not clear whether you needed an evaluation and you 
refused to participate in the psychological evaluation obtained by your first attorneys. 
3. It looks like your attorney had a conflict of interest because he represented Tim 
Feldman, Sr., at the same time he represented you. However, there was no objection to him 
representing you when he brought that to the court's attention. In case,s like th.is, where there is a 
potential conflict ofinterest but no objection, the defendant has to show that his attorney's 
performance was affected by the conflict. There is nothing. in the trial record which shows that, 
but you might be able to develop the evidence in post-conviction. This is potentially a good 
issue in post-conviction. 
4. :rhe court denied your motion for continuance but your attorney never made a showing 
of what the missing witness would have testified to or what efforts he had made to try to find the 
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witness. If you could prove that he could have found the witness and the witness would have 
been favorable to you, you could raise that on post-conviction. · 
5. Your attorney waived your right to a speedy trial in your absence. However, you had 
earlier waived your right to a speedy trial in open court when yoµ asked that your first attorneys 
be replaced. 
6, Your confidential psychological evaluation (where you refused to participate) . 
somehow got into the record. It is not clear how that happened. I(your attorney turned it over 
that could be part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
7. The trial court denied Mr. Cox's motion to withdraw. I couldn't raise this on appeal 
because you told the judge that it would be OK for Mr. Cox to continue to represent you. 
8. During the jury selection, the court denied your challenges to three potential jurors: 
Mill, Kimsey and Vaughn. Your attorney knocked off Mill and Vaughn, but the record doesn't 
show what.ha.ppened to-IGmsey. I'mllot sure this-makes any diI:ferencfl:iecause Kimsey was not-·· - · 
on the jury that rendered. the verdicts. . 
·9. The way impeachment was hru.idled during trial was very confusing, but tlJ.ere was no 
request that the court give an instruction to the jury on how to handle that evidence. 
10. The Miranda issue should be raised in post~conviction. Mr. Cox.did file a motion to 
suppress, but the court found that the motion was untimely (it was) and did not find good cause 
for the late filing. Without a finding of good cause to excuse the late filing, that 1ssue would not 
prevail on appeal. In addition, Mr. Cox did not introduce the video of the interrogation at the 
time of the motion. So, the Court ruled on the motion without being able to review the video. 
Finally, the argument on the motion to suppress was that you asked for an attorney during the 19-
second gap in the recording. The Court found that you didn't and just accepted the prosecutor's 
repr~sentation that you did not ask for counsel until 1:34:45 in the recording. Had your attorney 
played the entire recording for the court, the judge would have seen you mention or as~ for an 
attorney at 1:15:30; 1:17:50; 1:19:00; 1:22:50; and 1:31:30 (the times are approximate). This is 
another potentially strong issue in post-conviction. 
I suggest you start working on your post-conviction petition right away. You only have a 
year after the appeal is over to file that. I will not be able to assist you in drafting the petition, 
but if you would like the record in your case or just want to talk about potential issues, please let 
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DANIELL. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County J?rosecuting Attorney 
mug fFB 18 Pl11 3 OY 
Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lemston, Idaho 83.?01 
CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT 
;·dephone: (208}799-3073 
Idaho State Bar No. 2923 DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE SECOND J1JDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
. IN TBE MATTER OF Tiffi 
APPLICATION FOR A 
) ·CASE NO. __ ~--
-·---------- SEAR-CR-W~-:--------- ------- ______ ) ______ . AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH 
.) WARRANT - -----------·-- ·--------------
... 
STATE OF ID AHO) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
C0lv1ES NOW, Detective Brian Birdsell, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
That a:ffiant is the applicant for Search Warrant herein; 
That a:ffiant is a duly appointed, qualified and acting peace officer within the County of 
Nez Perce, State of Idaho; 
That affiant is employed by the Lewiston Police Department, in the official capacity or 
position of Detective, currently assigned to the Investigation Section as a detective. 
That affiaiit has been a trained and qualified peace officer for approximately (9) Yi nine 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 1 
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) and one half years; 
That affiant holds a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Lewis-Clark State 
College_ Thataffiantb.as approximately 1800 hours of training and·holds an.Advanced Peace 
Officers Standa,rd.s and Training Certificate. The training which the af:fiant has received has been 
in the areas of general patrol procedures, DUI enforcement, drug enforcement, interview and 
interrogation techniques, accident reconstruction and investigation, advanced evidence collection, 
domestic violence, stalking, as well as general, investigative techniques of crimes against persons 
and property. 
I 
Furthermore, affiant has received training in and has· experience in the investigation of 
theft, fraud, burglary, and possession of stolen property_ 
· --- -·---·- - ---·-------ThaHhere-is-r€asonabJe_cause_:to. b:_eli_eye th.at certain evidence hereinafter described is 
. .) 
) 
located in or upon the following described person to-wit; Gary Wayne Mallory,   
a white male approximately 6 feet O inches in height with brown hair and brown eyes and 
weighing approximately 200 pounds. 
That the property referred to and sought consists of any and aii physical evidence th.at is 
related to the person of the deceased subject, or instrumentalities and/or the manner of her death, 
e.g.: blood and or DNA samples, trace evidence, fingerprints and palm prints, fingernail 
scrapings, hair, fiber, and/or other microscopic elements, related to the cause of Charlene Mabie's 
death, possibly related to a death investigation of Charlene Marie Mallory, A.KA. Charlene Marie 
Mabie, from the person of Gary Mallory, the clothing, boots, and any electronic devices worn by 
or in the possession of Gary Mallory at the time of his detention by police on February 14, 2009. 
That in support of your a:ffiant1s assertion .and belief as to the existence _of probable cause, 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 2 
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J the following facts are off ere~ based upon personal I?iowledge of affiant, of which affiant 
believes to be true, to-wit: 
On 2-14-2009 at 1140 hrs Lewiston Police Officer were dispatched to a report of a 
deceased subject located at 1835 7th Avenue in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. Officer Rick 
Fuentes and Zach Ward arrived on scene. They were contacted by Timothy Feldman Sr. who 
flagged the officers down and asked if they were responding-to the homicide. -Feldman said Gary 
Mallory was there with his deceased wife and they were in the downstairs bedroom. 
~ers went into the residence and into the Southeast bedroom in the basement Th~. 
- =- ---aw yary Mallory laying in bed with his wife. Mallory said that the medics needed to hurry and 
· check on his wife. Mallory said thft,~f!:e had just squeezed lus h?Jld and talked with him 
IJcrvt1"'< ct,-\:J~uf lY\~ b.t;?.J~<; Ql),"#1~~ 
~e. 9 hi'-' <t~ l -::t,\\C .i- we.( c>'\ \f'N., V'<ne, 
-justnrinut-es-prier--to-peliB€--am¥at-Officer Zac Ward. c ecf'g! the_2_~se o(Charlen~ allory and 
_) C('ftcers tuc:x.,(c) (o~ ?)c:..Gl.6"-d en ~ c.,C 'C 3irQ.nc) J. ------ ·- ---
determined she was deceased, cold to. the touc~ and rigor mortis had already set in. Officer 
advised Gary Mallory that his wife was deceased. Gary Mallory stood up and immediately put his 
hands behind his back. Gary Mallory kept saying that the medics needed to hurry up and Officers 
k.{t'\t-"-S C\.bcr:0- Y--11.,~ p1101~ · _ 
advised him again that she was deceased. Gary Mallory was escorted to the upstairs of the 
residence. Gary Mallory kept his hands behind his back the entire time he was walking up the 
stairs and outside of the residence. Officers advised that they at no time told him to do this and 
----------------------·· 
was voluntary on his part Gary Mallory was not handcuffed at that time. 
Once outside Gary Mallory stepped off the porch and immediately went down to his knees 
where he kept his hands behind his back and asked for a cigarette that one of his friends provided. 




t~_ - t ..• ' 
Gary Mallory told Officer Zach Ward that his dad had picked him up from the bar this 
morning. Mallory then said that he had stayed at a friend's house th.is morning. Mallory said that 
he left the house around O 13 0 hrs and had just returned to the house and observed that she was 
passed out, he then put a blanket over her and left the residence. Mallory wouldn't identify the 
friend where he was ·at this morning. Mallory then said he stayed at his dad's house. Mallory told 
. Ofc Ward that he had also done a carpet job this morn.mg as well. Ofc Zach Ward said Mallory 
told hlm he wasn't at his dad's house either and had been at the Lucky.Inn and Overtime. Mallory 
said he then went to someone else house to get some tools, a Tom Bonine at 213 5 21st Street 
Mallory said he came back to the residence around 0630 this morning and Charlene 
Mallory was alive. He also said that Charlene Mallory was alive until around 10 minutes prior to 
· ····· - - · officers'~arrival. ·---------- ·--··············· ---------·--··---- _____ --------···----------- _______________ _ 
) 
) 
Officer Zach Ward took digital photographs of blood droplet on the right pant leg of Gary 
Mallory prior to bis being brought to Lewiston Police Department ·· 
Cpl George Hill interviewed the complainant to this call, Timothy Feldman Sr. Feldman 
Sr. said that Gary Mallory and Charlene Mallory had lived in the basement of his son, Timothy 
Feldman Jr.'s house for about 3 or 4 months. Feldman Sr. said that Charlene Mallory retmned 
home around 2330 to 0000 hrs and is intoxicated. Charlene Mallory made a statement that she 
can't take anymore of this and went downstairs to go to bed. Feldman Sr. said that Gary M~lory · 
came home from the bar around 0130· hrs and went straight dovm.stairs. 
Around 0830 hrs he woke up to Gary Mallory setting on the couch with a very odd look on 
his face. Mallory asked that Feldman Sr. go do-wn and talk with her as she won't talk to him. 
Mallory told Feldman Sr. that he might have screwed up and broke some nos, referring to 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 4 
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-,) Charlene Mabie (M:allory). Feldman Sr. ·said he went downstairs to check on Charlene Mabie and 
·opens the door and sees her lying down. He calls out her name and when he gets no response, he 
goes back upstairs. 
) 
Feldman Sr. says that Mallory leaves the house and makes a phone call a short time later to 
Carl's phone asking if Feldman Sr. wanted to go to the bar. Around 45 minutes later Gary comes 
back to house where Carl, Amber, Feldman Sr. are sitting on the couch. Gary Mallory was actin~ 
very weird and intoxicated. 
Gary Mallory turned to Amber and said since no one had the balls to down and check her 
pulse, and asked Amber to do it Amber went downstairs and came back up with a weird look on 
her face. Feldman Sr. and Carl go downstairs and Carl moves her arm to check for a pulse and 
.. ----- Charlene_Mab.ie_is _ _sti.ff_and cold._Ib.ey__go back URstairs. Feld.mans Sr. calls the police and and 
---- ----------------··---------------
Gary ~allory goes back downstairs. 
Det. Birdsell went to the scene and met Coroner Gazy Gilliam at the scene. Det. Birdsell 
went to the Southeast bedroom in the basement where Charlene Mabie (Mallory) was laying on the 
bed. She was on her back with her right arm in a straight position and left arm slightly bent 
forward. By the look of Mabie it was obvious that she was deceased and rigor mortis had set in. 
On Mabie's.neck there was bruising and scratch marks on the left side of the neck. There was a 
small amount of dried blood on the outer lips of Mabie, but no other visible signs of injury. There 
was .a cell phone laying on the chest of Mabie th.at Officers said Mallory was using and left on her 
chest. 
Cpl. George Hill interviewed Amber Taylor who advised that she came home this morning 
with her daughter. They entered through the basement and he daughter was trying to look into 





',...--~ .. - r- -.. \ . 
-') Mallory's room. She told her daughter not to look int0 the room and be respeotful. Amber then 
looked into the room and Gary Mallory was pressed up against the wall and Charlene Mabie was 
lying on the bed. She· said oh, I am sorry and went u~stairs. Amber Taylor and Mallory had 
argm:p.ent about Taylor's daughter's.manners and eating. Mallory then told Taylor that he should 
mind his manners and that he needed to mind his manners arid Taylor needed to go check her 
(Charlene Mabie's) pulse. Taylor tb.en·said "you did not" and Mallory replied "you better go 
check it". She went downstairs and called out Charlene's name 5 times and pulled down the 
blanket and Charlene didn't move. Taylor said she lqiew she was dead and went upstairs. Taylor 
came back upstairs Tim said "well" and Taylor replied "yeah". Mallory was holding a green duffel 




WHEREFORE, a:ffiant asserts that there is probable cause as required by law for the 
issuance of the search warrant requested herein, and that there is reasonable probable cause that the 
property sought as described herein is on the person or in the place to be searched as described 
. herein and, therefore, prays that a search warrant issue as requested directing a search for and 
seizure of the property hereinabove described. 
PE,fllc,£,-l:7I":E'-J:,::,.D.t\.. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this if day of__,....-~-:r-:9.__, -4~~+--' at 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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.\ Law Supplementa. l Narrative: 
) Supplemental Narratives 
Seq Name Date Narrative 
33 Birdsell Brian 18:30:31 02/18/2009 
Lewiston Police Supplemental Narrative 
09-L2220 
Officer Birdsell, #332 
18 February 09 
. Typed by: #366 
On 02-i8-09 I inventoried the green duffel bag which was seized pursuant to a 
search warrant on 02.-14-09 and taken from the living room area of 1835 7th 
Avenue. This would be the same green duffel bag that Gary Mallory came out of 
the basement carrying when he was asking Amber Taylor for a ride. 
The green duffel bag was emptied and inventoried. The duffel bag contained the 
- · follc:>wing i terns: 
1) Contained 12 do-rags (bandana head coverings) 
2) Five pairs of white socks 
3) Six pairs of underwear 
4) Sixteen t-shirts 
----5-}-S-ix--ta.nk-.t.op1~~~ili~i~~~--------------------------6) One pair.of black denim jeans 
) 7) One black-and gold zip-up coat 
_J 
8) One blue, white and red flannel shirt 
9) One pair of black shorts and One pair of camo shorts 
10) One pair of jean shorts 
11) One small green canyas-type linen bag· 
12) Two toothbru.shes 
13} One stick of Old Spice High Endurance deodorant 
14) One roll of Ace bandage wrap. 
W$ile looking at these items, I came across a blue Hells Canyo~ USA tank top 
shil:t. On this shirt, there appeared to be two areas, one on the lower left 
corner and the left upper chest near the armpit area where there appeared to be 
blood stains. It is unknown if these blood stains are related to this incident, 
however this· shirt was taken out of the green duffel bag. and bagged separately. 
This shirt will be forwarded on to the Idaho State Forensic Lab for biological 
· examination. 
All of the other clothing items were returned to the duffel bag and placed -in 
to evidence. 
End of report 
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In order for the Defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder, the State must 
prove th.at the murder: 
was a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. Premeditation means 
to consider beforehand whether to kill or not to :kill~ and then. to decide to 
kill. · There does not have to be any appreciable period of time during 
which the decision to kill was considered,. as long as it was reflected upon 
before the decision was made. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse; · 
even: though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditation.. 
If you unanii:n.ously. agree that the State has proven the _above s.peci~ circumstance 
beyond a reason.able doubt, you must :find the Defendant guilty of first degree murder. If 
you 1manimou,sly agree that the special circum.sumce has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must .find the Defendant guilty of second degree murder. 
All other murder is murder in the second degree. 
INSTRUCTIONS SUBMIITED TO THE JURY 
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ROBERT J. VAN IDOUR., ISBN 2644 
FITZGERALD & VAN IDOUR 
· Attod'.°eys at Law 
111 Main Stree~ Suite 301 
Lewiston., ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-4090 
Facsimile: (208) 746-5571. 
E-mail address: 1cdefender@qwestoffi.ce.net 
Ff LED 
tl»9 ffB .18 PPl ~ 3 q. 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF TIIB SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 










Case No. CR2009-01472 
MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION 
OF PSYCHIATRIST/PSYCHOLOGIST· 
AFFIDAVIT IN" SUPPORT OF MOTION 






Defendant, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves the Court to authorize the 
defense to retain a psychiatrist at the expense of the State. This Motion is based on Idaho Code 
Section § 19-852, the records and files of this case and the supporting Affidavit herein. 
Dated February 18, 2009 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO _ . ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
Robert J. Van Idour, after first being duly swam on oath, says as follows: 
My firm has been appointed as defense counsel 111 the above entitled case. 





CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on February 18, 2009 a true copy of this document was delivered to tb.e law· 
offices of the Pro~ecuting Attorney: 1109 F Street, Lewiston, ID 8350 lfollowing via the method 
noted below: · 
Sent via facsimile to facsimile number 799-3080 
Hand delivered via Valley Messengers 
Sent via postage prepaid U.S. Mail 
MOTION RE: PSYCHIATRIST; AFFIDAVIT 3 
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ROBERT J. VAN IDOUR, ISBN 2644 
FITZGERALD & VAN IDOPR 
Attorneys at Law 
111 Main Street, Suite 301 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6100 
Facs:imile: (208) 746-5571 
e-mail address: lcdefender@qwestoffi.ce.net 
# ...... ..... . . . 
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rn TBE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 





MOTION TO AUIHORIZE RETENTION 
OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 
AFFIDAVIT ill SUPPORT OF MOTION 
MOTION 
Defendant, by and tbroughhls undersigned counse4 moves the Court to authorize the 
defense to retain a private investigator at the expense of the State. This Motion is based on Idaho 
Code Section §19-852, the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, tb.e records and files of this case and the supporting Affidavit 
herein. 
Dated February 18, 2009 R~).\JJJ_ 
Robert J. ya:rJ. !dour 
Defense Cel.fu.sel 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
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Robert J. Van Idour, after first being duly sworn on oath, says as follows: 
My firm has been appointed as defense counsel in the above entitled case. 
The defendant in this case is Gary W. Mallory IL :Mr. Mallory is currently incarcerated 
oh the charge in this case. 
The defense in this case is in need of the services of a private investigator. In addition to 
witnesses to be interviewed there are also potentially items of physical evidence to be examined 
and factual details to be investigated. 
Affi.ant is not a trained homicide· investigator, nor has Affiant ever wo:dced as a peace 
officer. It is Affiant' s belief that in ord~r to conduct a proper investigation. the services qf a 
private investigator with training in homicide investigations are n~cessary. Under Section 4.1 of 
the Gui_delines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense. Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 
an investigator is designated as part of the core defense team that is necessary for proper · 
representation of defend.ants in capital cases. 
Further your affiant sayetb. not. 
Dated February 18, 2009 
Robert J. V dour 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public of Idaho, this 18th day of 
February, 2009. 
MOTIO}:T RE:PRN ATE JNVESTIGATOR; 
AFFIDAVIT 2 
q(W?UL)< ~~uL4__ 
Notary Public of Idaho, residing at 
Lewiston, therein_ 





Robert J. Van Idour, ISBN 2644 
FITZGERALD & VAN IDOUR 
Attorneys at Law 
111 Main Strees Suite 301 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6100 
F~imile: (208) 746-5571 
E-mail: lcdefender@qwestoffice.net 
F',:_1 TY e:". WEEKS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE · 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
















Case No. CR2009-1472 
MOTION TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION 
OF PATHOLOGIST 
AF.FIDA VIT OF COUNSEL 
MOTION 
Defend.an~ by and through his undersigned counsel, moves the Court to authorize the 
defense to retain a forensic pathologist at the expe~e of the State. Tbis Motion is based on Idaho 
Code S~tion § 19-852, the records and files of this case and the supporting Affidavit herein. 
Dated Febmary 18, 2009. 
STATE OFIDABO ) 
) ss. 




Robert J~ Van Idour, after first being duly sworn on oa~ says as follows: 
My firm has been appointed as defense counsel in the above entitled case. 
- ' 
MorioN TO AUTHORIZE RETENTION OF PATHOLOGIST- 1 of3 
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Tbis procedure is especially appropriate in this_case because: 
A. 
B. 
The defend.ant is charged with fust degree murder, the only Idaho crime · 
carrying the potential of the d~tb. penalty. Without a separate resource 
judge, the same judge hearing fiscal matters ( and thus possibiy becoming 
privy to unsuccessful defense forensic testing, for example) could determine 
the fate of the sJ.efendant. _A similarly situated defendant with private 
resources would not have to reveal such privileged strategies to a Court A 
similarly situated defendant with private resources is not forced to reveal to 
the sentencing judge priviieged matters. · . . 
The resource judge procedure has been commonly used in the past by courts 
in the Second Judicial District. 
Dated: February 17, 2009 
f~.\ ~i-
~obert J. va(¥.our 
Defense Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 ~G--- . 
I hereby certify that on Feb~~ 20~9 a troe copy o~tbis document was de?ve~ to . 
the law office~ of the Prosecutmg Attorney, 1109 F Street, 4WJ.Ston,ID. 83501followmg via tb.e 
method noted b~klw:· · 
~ent via facsimile to facsimile number 799-3080 
Hand delivered via Valley Messengers 
Sent via postage prepaid U.S. Mail 
FITZG;ERALD. & VAN IDOUR 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83 70 I 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Attorney for Appellant 
-IN TEE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 







) .AFFIDAVIT IN St1PPORT OF 
) SECOND UNOPPOSED 
) MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
GARY WAYNE MALLORY, ) OF11ME'TOFILEOPENING 
c-
-----------~------'\--------RBRIEF----------
r) ~~~ ) t-
Dennis Benjamin, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says: 
I. That I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. That I am appointed counsel for the Appellant in the above-entitled case. 
3. That the Appellant's Openmg '.Briefis due on September 13, 2011. 
4. Current counsel has made one other request for an extension of time. 
5. That pursuant to a staniling agreement with the Attomey General's Office I am 
authorized to say that the Respondent does not object to this motion. 
6. That I have not been able to complete this brief due to the press of other matters. In 
particular, in the last four weeks I prepared for and participated in an evidentiary hearing in a 
1 • AFFIDAVIT W SUPPORT OF SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TTh1E TO·FILE OPENING BRIEF 
-
Cvi.11~ :_ 7 . 





l. __ ) 
C ) 
~ ...... -
J".• .. ··, 
:( . 
first-degree murder post-conviction case and prepared for and participated in a sentencing 
hearing m a serious felony case. I was th.en out of the office for a week taking my only child to 
college. I became ill on that trip, missed two days of work and was not able to work at my 
normal rate for the rest of that week. I have also been working ·on a response to a motion for 
summary judgrp.ent in a federal habeas case. During this time, I also attended to the day-to-day 
requirements of approximately 25 other cases pending in the state and federal courts. 
7. That all efforts will be made to file the brief by the requested date. 
8. That the extension of time will permit me to submit a cogent presentation of the issues 
on appeal for the Court and permit me to afford my client the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
This ends my affidavit. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
this ~~of September, 2011 · ····· 
.~\~ M. 13~·---~ 
c:::.~ .......... . o,..· .. . 
,~ •• . .... "P ~ ,~~.~. . -··~ ~ 
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2 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILWG 
I HEREBY CERTI;FY that I have this {:5~ day of September, 2011, caused a true an,d 
correct copy of i:4e foregoing doc1.ID1.ent to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepl;rid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Cr:immal Law Division 
:r_o. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
~~~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
3 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF 
( 
r·, 








NEVIN, BENJAMIN', McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN nm SUPRE1v.IB COURT OF nm STATE OF IDAHO 












GARY WAYNE MALLORY, 
Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
FILE OPENING BIDEF 
Demris Benja:rrrin, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby says:· 
1. Th.at I am an attorney duly_ licensed to practic~ iaw in the State of Idaho. 
2. Th.at I am ap12ointed counsel for the Appellant in the above-entitled case. 
3. That the Appellant's Opening Brief is due on August 16, 2011. 
4. Current counsel has not made auy other requests foi; an ext~nsion of time. 
5. That pursuant to a standing agreement with the Attorney General's Office I am 
auth.oriz~d to say that the Respondent does not object to this motion. 
6. That I have not been able to complete this brief due to the press of other matters. In 
particular, last week I filed a reply brief in State v. Olson, No. 36749 and was occupied in 
1 • AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE OPENING BRIEF 






\ ) ,._. __ .,.,.. 
( {. ,:, 
preparing a brief in a state post-conviction proceeding in a :first-degree murder case which I filed 
only yesterday. In addition, I have been preparing for fill evjdentiary hearing in another first-
degree murder post-conviction case set later this week and in attending to the day-to-day 
requirements of approximately 25 other cases pending in the state and federal courts. 
7_ That all efforts will be made to file the.brief by the requested date. 
&. That the extension ohime will permit me to-submit a cogent presentation of the.issues 
on appeal for the Court and permit me to afford my client the e:efective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
This ends my affidavit. 
2 • AFTIDA VIT IN SUPPORT OF UN.OPPQSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 









l CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l_) 
/(~ . I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have tbis _1;::::,._ day of August, 2011, caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
3 • AFFIDAVIT 1N SUPPORT OF UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF Tll\1E 





Gregory R. Hurn 
Kwate Law Offices, PLLC 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501' 
Telephone: (208) 746-7060 
Fax: (208) 746-2660 
Idaho State Bar# 8753 




PATTY 0. WEE.KS 
CLERK~~ 
. {jl. D.f PUTY · 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
Gary W. Mallory, II, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of C..\~C'\A~) 
) Case No. CV 2013-00763 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF THE PETITIONER 
) IN S_:(JPPORT OF AMENDED 
) PETITION FOR POST 





GARY W. MALLORY, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that: 
1. Gary W. Mallory II, am the Petitioner in the Nez Perce County Case Number 
CV2013-00763. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER 
IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 
PETffiON FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 1 
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2. Appellate counsel assigned in this matter, Mr. Benjamin, visited with me at the Idaho 
Correction Facility on August 16th, 2011. At that visit Mr. Benjamin told me that he would provide 
me with a copy of the court record before the opening brief was filed so that I could aid in my appeal. 
Mr. Benjamin did not provide that court record before filing the opening brief and I was therefore 
unable to assist in my appeal. 
3. During a telephone call on October 6th, 2011, Mr. Benjamin told me that the motion 
to suppress evidence regarding Lewiston Police Officer Zach Ward's testimony, filed by my trial 
counsel could not be appealed and that only "motions in limine" could be appealed. 
4. During the course of preparing to represent me at trial, Neil Cox did not investigate 
the alleged crime scene or investigate information I provided to him regarding the possibility of other 
people in the residence or could hear arguments or physical altercations due to the ability of sound 
to pass through the duct work in the residence. 
5. During the course of preparing to represent me at trial, Mr. Cox did not discuss any 
investigation or report from private investigator John Shrader that was conducted on my behalf. I 
was therefore unable to assist in my defense with regards to this information. 
6. ItismyunderstandingthatMr. Shrader, spokewithDebraAnnShelmanandthatMs. 
Shelman provided statements to Mr. Shrader that I was not at the Overtime Bar on February 13th, 
2009, which was in opposition to other witnesses testimony at trial. This information was not 
provided to me by Mr. Cox before trial so that I could aid in my own defense with regard to this 
testimony and opposing testimony. 
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7. To my knowledge, my original trial counsel, Bob Van !dour, did not make any 
inquiries into how the body would be disposed of or when it would be disposed of. 
8. To my knowledge, Mr.Van !dour, did not make any attempts to preserve my wife's 
body from being cremated despite his motion to have the county pay for an independent pathologist 
to aid in my defense. 
9. Coroner Gary L. Gilliam, signed an authorization form that permitted the cremation 
of my wife's body on February 25th, 2009. 
10. Kathy Owens, Peggy Mallory, PatrinaMcMasters, Terri Bailey, Brandy Sanders, and 
Debra Shelman have made representations to me that they had potential testimony that was in direct 
contradiction to other witnesses testimony at trial. This potential testimony was known to Mr. Cox 
prior to trial and was not pursued at trial. 
11. On more than one occasion, I asked Mr. Cox to investigate and speak with Wes Hardy 
as both a potential witness and as a potential suspect Mr. Cox did not pursue this request because 
as Mr. Cox told me the absence of Mr. Hardy being gone at trial would be beneficial to my case. 
12. Mr. Cox represented to the Court that he had tried to call Mr. Hardy one (1) time and 
that a woman had answered and she would not wake up Mr. Hardy at that time to speak with Mr. 
Cox. To my knowledge Mr. Cox made no other attempts to speak with Mr. Hardy to investigate his 
potential testimony in preparation for trial. 
13. To my knowledge, Mr. Cox did not conduct any independent investigation of 
information contained in police narrative reports to prepare in defense of my trial. 
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14. During the course of the recorded police interrogation of me in this criminal matter 
attheLewistonPoliceDepartment, I asked to have an attorney present at 1:15:30, 1:17:50, 1:19:00, 
1 :22:50, and 1 :31 :30, all of which occurred before my final request for an attorney at 1 :34:45. 
15. On several occasions during the course of litigating my criminal case, in-chamber 
hearings occurred and the matters discussed and results of those hearings were not discussed by trial 
counsel with me either before or after the hearings so that I could provide any aid in my own defense 
for those hearings. 
16. During preparation for the defense of my case, I reviewed the recorded video of the 
police interrogating me. I pointed out to trial co-counsel, Thomas Clark Jr., that the scratch marks 
that the prosecution alleged occurred during the commission of the alleged crime were not present 
at the earlier points in the video and that those marks were the result of a struggle with the police 
during a later part of the interrogation. 
17. Trial Counsel, Mr. Cox, employed his wife in his law practice during his 
representation of me at trial. His wife is a cousin of Amber Taylor, a witness in the trial. To my 
knowledge this matter was never placed in the court record by Mr. Cox as a potential conflict of 
interest. Had it been placed on the record and made known to me, I would have objected to Mr. Cox 
continuing to represent me in this matter. 
18. Trial Counsel, Mr. Cox, did not attemptto attack witness Amber Taylor's credibility 
at trial, which I believe was an omission based upon the aforementioned familial relationship with 
his wife. 
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19. On October 23rd, 2009, I called my attorney, Mr. Cox, and asked him to define and 
explain my rights to a speedy trial. Instead of doing that, Mr. Cox told me he would do that at a later 
date, which never occurred. 
20. On November 9th, 2009, at a hearing in front of the Court, Mr. Cox represented to 
the Court that he had explained to me my rights to a speedy trial. Mr. Cox had not in fact had any 
discussion with me regarding my right to a speedy trial before this hearing. 
21. On November 11th, 2009, Mr. Cox brought a form acknowledging my right to a 
speedy trial, two days after he represented to the court that he had discussed this matter with me. 
22. Prior to Mr. Cox being appointed as my counsel, neither Mr. Van Idour or Ms. 
McFarland mentioned to me what my speedy right to a trial entailed nor that any request on my part 
to have different counsel appointed would negatively impact my right to a speedy trial. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT 
DATED this J!i_ day of August, 2013. 
Gary W. Mallory 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to me before this 1!1._day of August, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I ~ay of August, 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was: 
Mailed 
Faxed 
_L_ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight mail 
to the following; 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER 
IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By b~e.Q,--
Grego~Hum 
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Time: 11:00 am 
Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Greg Hurn 
April Smith· 
Petitioner not present (incarcerated Department of Corrections). 
Court addresses counsel. Petitioner has filed an Amended Petition and the 
State has filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
110121 Mr. Hurtl addresses the Court 
· 110200 Petitioner'sresponse brief due 9-6-13 and Court will hear argumenton 9-19-
13 at 2:30 p.m. 
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Hearing type: Oral Argument 
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· Mr. Hurn is prepared to proceed. 
Court will proceed without Mr. Mallory. Ms. Ashford no lo~ger on the 
23414 Courtaddressescounsel. 
23420 Ms. Ceccarelli addresses the Court 
23509 . .Mr. Hurn addresses the Court 
. . 
· 23540 · .. Court takes matter under advisement and will issue written decision. 
23557 Court recess. 
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CASE NO. CV 2013-0763 
OPINION AND ORDER 
ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
This matter came before the Court on the State's Motion for Summary 
,, ,,])ispe&t~.'.Ihe-Retitioner was represented by Gregory Hurn, of the firm Kwate Law 
Offices. The State was represented by Nance Ceccarelli, Nez Perce County Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney. The parties were before the Court on September 19, 2013.1 At 
that time, the matter was submitted to the Court on the briefs filed by the parties. The 
Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
1 Counsel for the Petitioner and the State were present in the courtroom. The Court attempted to contact 
the Petitioner via teleconference; however, the Petitioner was not available due to circumstances at the 
prison. 
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BACKGROUND 
Following a trial by jury, Gary Mallory was found guilty on March 17, 2010, in 
Nez Perce County Case CR-2009-0172, of Murder in the First Degree, I.C. §18-4001, 18-
4002, and 18-4003, and Domestic Battery, I.C. § 18-918(2)(a) and 18-903(a). On June 3, 
· 2010, the Court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-eight (28) years to life for Murder 
in the First Degree, and two (2) years for Domestic Battery, to run consecutively. The 
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
the Petitioner's conviction on January 3, 2012. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the 
Petition for Review on May 22, 2012. A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was timely 
filed on April 12, 2013. 
The State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on May 16, 2013. A Brief in 
Support of the Motion for Summary Disposition was filed on August 5, 2013. An 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief were filed August 14, 2013. The matter 
was set for hearing on the State's motion for summary disposition on September 19, 
2013. At that time, the parties submitted the matter to the Court for review on the State's 
motion and the Amended Petition presented by the Petitioner. 
There are four broad claims which are addressed in the motion for summary 
dismissal. These claims are ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and allegations of 
judicial misconduct. 
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POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
- -· _,.,._,...,.,.,-~~·-~'-'-·'4-..:-..:.. •. ~ ...... ~1.---,· •• ·.·--- ---..·-- ~~'-- --
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a 
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution 
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented 
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is 
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
( 6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through ( f), Idaho 
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack 
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common 
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
I.C. § 19-4901(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief ''may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration.of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from 
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." LC. § 19-
4902(a) 
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the 
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 
711, 905 P .2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). ~'An application for post-conviction relief 
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285, 
287, 912 P.2d 653, 655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that 
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction 
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
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applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the petition. I.C. § 19-4903." Id. 
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and 
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim 
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). 
Under I.C. § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief 
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, 
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If 
the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711, 
905 P .2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any 
fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
DISCUSSION 
The petition before this Court has been appropriately filed pursuant to the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (hereafter "UPCP A"f "[T]he UPCP A was 
instituted as the exclusive vehicle to present claims regarding whether a conviction or 
2 The Petitioner's claims do not fall under the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus. "A writ of habeas 
corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful conditions of confinement," 
. Id.; Old.fl v. State, 122 Idaho 976, 979, 842 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1992). The distinction between a 
· petition for post-conviction relief and a writ of habeas corpus is important because the constitutional 
remedy of habeas corpus has no time limitation. Id. 
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sentence was entered in violation of constitutional or statutory law." Eubank v. State, 
130 Idaho 861, 863, 949 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ct. App. 1997); Still v. State, 95 Idaho 766, 
768, 519 P.2d 435, 437 (1974). There are four general claims made by the Petitioner-
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, 
and judicial misconduct. 
, -·"-t'-meftective assistance of counsel claims. 
In order to survive summary dismissal, the Petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that a material issue of facts exists as to two issues: whether the counsel's 
performance was deficient, and wheth~r the deficiency prejudiced the Petitioner's case. 
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to survive summary dismissal, the 
petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-
65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1~84); Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 
177 P.3d 362,367 (2008). To establish deficient assistance, the claimant 
has the burden of showing that her attorney's conduct fell below an 
objective standard qf reasonableness. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d 
at 367. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the 
. claimant's counsel was competent and diligent. Id. More simply put, "the 
··-··- '-standard for· evaluating attorney performance is objective reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms." State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 
306, 986 P .2d 323, 329 (1999). ,Additionally, to establish prejudice, the 
claimant must show a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's 
deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d at 367. 
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624-625, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271-1272 (2010). Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, for trial counsel or appellate counsel, are judged under the 
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. 
Ed. 674 (1984). 
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An accused has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 
(1963). The right to counsel necessarily includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 
S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, n. 14 (1970); Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801,806, 839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992). The right to 
effective assistance of counsel extends to the defendant's first appeal as a 
matter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836, 83 
L.Ed.2d 821, 829 (1985). 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007). 
a. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
The Petitioner sets forth four claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. 3 These assertions are: first, that appellate counsel failed to appeal the district 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, that appellate counsel failed to appeal 
the district court's ruling precluding the defense from introducing alternate :perpetrator 
evidence, that appellate counsel failed to appeal the district court's error in precluding the 
defense from arguing for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter, and finally, that appellate counsel did not fully investigate the record and 
litigate irregularities that occurred befo.re and during the trial. 
Of the four claims set forth by the Petitioner, three are claims in which the 
Petitioner fails to provide evidence that an objection was made at trial. The Petitioner 
states the district court erred in precluding the defense from introducing alternate 
perpetrator evidence; however, the Petitioner fails to provide a record of this ruling. The 
same is true of the claims regarding jury instructions and allegations of irregularities that 
occurred before and during trial. 
3 The claims of ineffective appellate counsel are listed as claims a-d within the Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
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In Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals discussed whether appellate counsel is ineffective for failing to raise issues of 
fundamental error on direct appeal, where trial counsel did not reserve an issue for appeal 
by stating an objection at trial. Ultimately, the Court held that allowing post-conviction 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise issues of fundamental error 
on appeal is impractical and better addressed in a post-conviction action asserting 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
First, Idaho case law establishes no bright line delineating categories of 
errors that will be deemed fundamental, and thus subject to appellate 
review without objection below. Therefore, a rule deeming appellate 
· · ·· · · ··-cuansetineffective for failing to raise an issue of fundamental error would 
force appellate attorneys to raise on appeal nearly all possible errors, 
whether preserved by objection in the trial court or not, to avoid the risk of 
being declared ineffective. This would be a misuse ofthe resources of 
appellate defense counsel, the Idaho Attorney General's Office, and the 
Idaho appellate courts. Such a rule would also place on our trial and 
appellate courts in post-conviction proceedings the difficult task of 
determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular error was 
actually "fundamental" and whether the record on direct appeal was 
sufficient to review the claim at that time. 
Second, it is often not to a criminal defendant's advantage to raise an 
issue of fundamental error on direct appeal because the record in the 
criminal proceeding may not be adequately developed for a full 
presentation of the defendant's claim. For example, Idaho's appellate 
courts have held that the State's violation of a plea agreement is 
fundamental error that may be reviewed in the absence of objection in the 
trial court, State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106 P.3d 397,400 (2005); 
State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915-16, 693 P.2d 1112, 1117-18 
(Ct.App.1985), but this Court has also declined to address such claims 
' '-"-wliere-ffie'iecord on a.ppea.J. is not complete enough to allow appellate 
examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim. 
State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733-34, 932 P.2d 358, 361-62 
(Ct.App.1997). In the latter circumstance, we have leftthe issue for 
presentation in a post-conviction proceeding, where an adequate record 
could be developed. We have also observed that if the appellate court were 
to consider, as fundamental error, the merits of a claim that cannot be 
adequately supported by the bare record in the criminal proceedings, it 
would require that we rule against the appealing defendant, and that ruling 
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would be res judicata, precluding the defendant from later pursuing the 
,~ls.S!!~.i.n_a,pqst-conviction action where adequate evidence to support the 
claim might be presented. See generally State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 
376, 859 P.2d 972,974 (Ct.App.1993). See also LC.§ 19-490l(b) 
(precluding assertion in a post-conviction action of any issue that was or 
could have been raised on direct appeal). 
Third, a trial attorney's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or 
other potential errors may be done for legitimate strategic or tactical 
purposes. See, e.g., Prattv. State, 134 Idaho 581,584 n. 1, 6 P.3d 831,834 
n. 1 (2000). The record on direct appeal would rarely disclose this 
practical strategy, and it would be incorrect to grant relief to a defendant in 
such a circumstance. 
Finally, the allowance of this type of claim for ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a defendant's rights 
because the defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the trial 
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for 
failing to object to the alleged error in the trial court. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, a rule allowing a post-conviction claim 
·· ···-efmeffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise an issue of 
fundamental error would be impractical, inefficient, and often · 
disadvantageous to defendants whose interest would be better served by 
presenting such a claim in a post-conviction action asserting ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. 
Id. at 662, 168 P.3d at 40. For the same reasons as asserted in Mintun, the Petitioner's 
claims would be best addressed in this post-conviction proceeding as ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims. 
Further, "an applicant must allege, and then prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 
Idaho 844,846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). 
We determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions, together with any affidavits on 
~·me~·Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Ricca v. 
State, 124 Idaho 894,896,865 P.2d 985,987 (Ct.App.1993). However, 
while the underlying facts must be regarded as true, the petitioner's 
conclusions need not be so accepted. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P Jd 
at 1069. 
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Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,902,277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012). A petitioner 
must tender a factual showing based on evidence that would be admissible at trial. Id. at 
.. 993,:21-TP.-3d-at 1-055. 
In the case at hand, the Petitioner fails to set forth facts in support of his 
allegations. The Petitioner does not support his claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel with evidence from the record, nor does he provide facts in his affidavit 
in support of his petition. The only claim of the four which raises issues of material fact 
is the claim that appellate counsel failed to appeal the district court's ruling on the motion 
to suppress evidence. However, this matter is best addressed as a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, because the matter was presented to the trial court in an 
untimely manner and the trial court did not find good cause to excuse the late filing. 
Therefore, the issue is similar to matters of fundamental error, as set forth in Mintun. 
Uitimateiy;·tlie Petitioner has failed to set forth a material issue of fact regarding his 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and thus, the State's motion to 
summarily dismiss these claims is granted. 
b. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. 
The Amended Petiti6.n for Post Conviction relief sets forth fourteen claims4 of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As stated above, ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are judged under the factors set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984). 
In the case at hand, the Petitioner has established a material issue of fact with 
respect to four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. These claims are: first, 
.. '---·•-.-·-···-~-- ... , 
4 The ineffective assistance of rounsel claims are labeled claims e-r within the Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
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whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not reviewing private 
investigator Shrader' s report with the Petitioner so that he could assist in his own 
defense; second, whether counsel was ineffective by not fully litigating and presenting to 
the district court evidence of statements made by the Petitioner during police 
interrogation, -in support of the Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence; third, whether 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose on the record a potential conflict of 
interest where witness Amber Taylor may have been related to trial counsel's wife; and 
fourth, whether counsel was ineffective when Petitioner's right to speedy trial was 
waived without his consent. 5 
The remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 6 as set forth in the 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, are summarily dismissed. Many of the 
assertions of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are not supported by facts which show 
that if the allegation were true, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the 
· ··- ·- ·-·court's· own initiative: Summary dismissal of an application is the 
procedural equivalent of summ~ judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56. "A claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to 
summary dismissal ... if the applicant has not presented evidence making a 
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quotingBergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 
518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998)). If there exists a genuine issue of material 
fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to 
the requested relief, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. State_ v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 
138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct.App.2002). As the trial court 
rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary 
hearing, summary dismissal is appropriate where the evidentiary facts are 
5 The three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which will be considered in an evidentiary hearing 
are set forth in the Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief as claims :t: 1, p, and r. 
6 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims which are dismissed as set forth in the Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief as claims e, g, h, i, j, k, m, n, o, and q. 
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· not disputed, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn 
from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the 
conflict between those inferences. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,444, 
180 P.3d 476,483 (2008); Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353,355, 195 P.3d 
712, 714 (Ct.App.2008). That is, the judge in a post-conviction action is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the 
motion for summary disposition, but rather is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. 
Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.3d at 714. 
Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710,713,274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 2012). Each claim will 
.be . .addressed:regarding the uncontroverted evidentiary facts presented to the court. 
In claim e, the Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to not 
personally investigate the crime scene prior to trial. However, the Petitioner fails to set 
forth facts which would explain how the outcome of trial would have been different had 
trial counsel personally visited the home where the crime occurred. Further, as noted in 
the underlying criminal file, trial counsel was appointed to represent the Petitioner 
several months after the crime had taken place. Thus, it is possible that counsel may not 
have been allowed to investigate the crime scene, as suggested by the Petitioner. Because 
the Petitioner fails to set forth facts which would establish the outcome of the trial would 
· have been different but for counsel's failure to visit the crime scene, this claim is 
.:1 ..1.: • ' surnmru.uy-u:isnnssea; · 
In claim g, the Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to prevent the cremation of the victim's body before the Petitioner had the 
opportunity to seek an independent pathologist's examination. The Petitioner has failed 
to set forth facts which establish that but for the opportunity to seek an independent 
pathologist examination; the outcome of the case would have been different. The 
Petitioner has not provided expert testimony from a pathologist to establish that the 
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autopsy of the victim was done incorrectly. Without evidence to suggest an independent 
examination would have changed the outcome of the case, this claim is summarily 
dismissed. 
In claim h, the Petitioner assets trial counsel was not adequately educated in the 
field of forensic pathology and thus unable to adequately cross-examine the State's 
witness at trial. The Petitioner provides no facts in support of this allegation, and further, 
fails to provide references to the trial court record which support his argument that trial 
counsel inadequately cross-examined the forensic pathologist. Conclusory allegations, 
unsubstantiated by any fact; are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary 
hearing. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Thus, this claim is summarily dismissed. 
In claim i, the Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective because he did not 
interview or investigate several material witnesses that would have presented testimony 
in contradiction to the state's theory and state witness' testimony. Again, the Petitioner 
has failed to establish facts in support of this allegation. The record before this Court 
does not contain affidavits which set forth admissible evidence which suppqrt the · 
Petitioner's claim. A similar issue was addressed in Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 
27 4 P .3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012). In Rossignol, the Petitioner asserted trial counsel was 
. ineffectiveJailfug to subpoena a doctor to testify at trial. 
We now address Rossignol's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to timely subpoena a doctor to testify at trial. Assuming the alleged 
deficiency, Rossignol did not present an affidavit from the doctor in 
support of his application for post-conviction relief confirming what the 
doctor would have testified to. As such, Rossignol's allegation as to how 
the doctor would have testified is merely speculative. Under the second 
prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
showing of prejudice requires more than mere speculation about what a 
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witness may have said. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 
924, 927 (2001); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 
(Ct.App.2007). Accordingly, Rossignol's claim fails under the second 
prong of Strickland. 
Id. at 710,274 P.3d at 11. In the case at hand, the Petitioner's assertion as to how these 
witnesses would testify is merely speculative. Thus, the Petitioner fails to meet the 
second prong of the Strickland test Therefore, this claim is summarily dismissed. 
In claimj, the Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective· for failing to discuss 
specific trial strategy with the Petitioner. The Petitioner does not support this allegation 
with detailed facts from the record. Furth.er, the Petitioner does not show that but for the 
lack of discussion, the outcome of the case may have been different. Conclusory 
aHegations.,. unsubstantiated by any fact, are i..11.sufficient to entitle a petitioner to an 
evidentiary hearing. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 
1986). Thus, this claim is summarily dismissed. 
In claim k, the Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct 
discovery of Wes Hardy, who may have been a potential witness or an alternative 
perpetrator of the crime. The Petitioner does not provide affidavits or information in the 
record to support how Hardy may have testified, nor does he provide any information in 
support of his assertion that Hardy may have been a suspect in the murder. See 
Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 710,274 P.3d at 11. Without evidence to support this allegation, 
the Petitioner's claim is summarily dismissed. 
·· -Irr claim m, the Petitioner asserl.S that trial counsel was ineffective· because 
counsel and co-counsel were unqualified to litigate a death penalty case. Qualification of 
appointed counsel in death penalty cases is set forth in I.C.R 44.3. The record in the 
underlying criminal case indicates that the Petitioner was first assigned attorney Robert 
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Van Idour, who was qualified as lead counsel under the requirements of this rule. At the 
time that Mr. Cox was assigned as trial counsel in this matter, the case was no longer a 
death penalty case. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot establish that he was prejudiced 
because his trial counsel was not qualified pursuant to I.C.R. 44.3. Thus, this claim is 
summarily dismissed. 
In claim n, the Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform 
the Petitioner regarding in-chamber discussions between the prosecuting attorney, trial 
counsel and the court. The Petitioner fails set forth specific instances from the record 
where trial counsel failed to consult with him. Further, the Petitioner has not set forth 
events from the trial record where he would have provided information to counsel which 
may have changed counsel's approach ~o the defense. Further, the claim hinges on 
info~~~ .st!,at~¢c and tactical choices made by trial counsel. Ordinarily a court will not 
second-guess informed trial strategy. 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, a court ordinarily will not 
second-guess informed strategic and tactical choices made by trial counsel. 
See Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10,539 P.2d at 562 (1975); Fee, supra; Davis v. 
State, 116 Idaho at 406, 77 5 P .2d at 1248. However, "when counsel's trial 
strategy decisions are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation, the defendant may well have been denied the competent 
assistance of counsel." Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10,539 P.2d at 562 (emphasis 
added). Moreover, "even errors in strategy can be so grave that they 
represent circumstances in which an issue of ineffective assistance exists." 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 58,813 P.2d 857,869 (1991) (Boyle, J., 
concurring). 
Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649, 658, 946 P.2d 71, 80 (Ct. App. 1997). The Petitioner 
has failed to set forth evidence that trial counsel made strategy decisions based upon 
· inadequate preparation, or other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation. Nor has 
the Petitioner set forth facts to show how the outcome of the case would have been 
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different had he been consulted by counsel. Therefore, this claim is summarily 
dismissed. 
In claim o, the Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for not fully litigating 
exculpatory evidence displaying Petitioner's body without scratch marks at the beginning 
of a recorded interrogation, which would have contradicted the State's theory that 
Petitioner had marks on his body which were a result of a struggle. The Petitioner has 
provided photos which show scratch marks on his back. However, the Petitioner fails to 
provide evidence from the record that supports his claim that the State asserted these 
scratch marks were received as a result of a struggle with the victim in this case. Further, 
the Petitioner fails to set forth facts which would establish that but for this evidence, the 
outcome of the case would have been different. Thus, claim o is summarily dismissed. 
In claim q, the Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for not litigating that his 
Fourth Amendment Right was violated by Officer Birdsell's search and seizure of a 
duftle-6agwhlch was not listed in the search warrant of the residence where the crime 
occurred. The Petitioner has provided pictures of items that were packed in the duflle 
bag, which included various items of clothing and personal items owned by the 
Petitioner. The Petitioner fails to establish how the evidence of the search was used 
against him at trial. Further, the Petitioner has failed to establish that a pretrial motion on 
this issue would have been granted in his favor. The Petitioner has set forth documents 
which support his claim that officers failed to list the duffel bag on the initial application 
for search warrant. However, it appears from the record provided by the Petitioner that 
the officers remedied the error, and thus, the Petitioner fails to establish that a motion to 
suppress on this claim would have been granted. See Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 266 
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P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011). Without a record establishing that the motion would have 
been granted, the Petitioner cannot establish that counsel was ineffective on this issue. 
Therefore, this claim is summarily dismissed. 
2. Prosecutorial misconduct claims. 
The Petitioner asserts two claims of prosecutorial misconduct: first, that the 
prosecuting attorney committed misconduct in relation to a video-taped interview of the 
Petitioner by law enforcement; and second, the prosecuting attorney committed 
misconduct by presenting testimony from witness Larry Shafer which was known to be 
false by the prosecuting attorney based upon potential testimony from other witnesses. 
The first claim is related to a similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the 
Petitioner will be afforded an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 7 
The Petitioner's second claim, ~hat the prosecutor presented testimo~y from 
witness Larry Shafer which was known to be false, is summarily dismissed. 8 The 
Petitioner provides no evidence in the record to support this allegation.9 Conclusory 
allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an 
evideniiaiy-hearuig. Baruth v. Gardne,:-, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,_ 372 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
3. Judicial misconduct claims. 
· The Petitioners remaining claims assert judicial misconduct. These claims are set 
forth as claims u, v, and win the Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief. These 
7 An evidentiary hearing will be conducted with respect to claim s, as set forth in the Amended Petition for 
· Post Conviction Relief. This claim addresses similar issues as those set forth in claim 1. 
8 This claim is set forth as claim t in the Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
9 The Petitioner asserts that Kathy Owens, Debra Ann Shelman, and Margaret Mallory would have testified 
in direct contradiction to Shafer's testimony, however, the Petitioner does not support this claim with 
affidavits from these individuals. Further, it is speculative to claim the Prosecuting Attorney presented 
evidence which is lmown to be false. The criminal record indicates that Mr. Shafer offered his testimony 
under the penalty of perjury. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION 16 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
1, 
185
claims are summarily dismissed because the Petitioner failed to raise the claims on direct 
appeal. I. C. § 19-4901 (b) states, in pertinent part, that "any issue which could have been 
raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-
conviction proceedings." A review of the appellate proceedings in this case indicates that 
these matters were not addressed on appeal. Thus, they will not be considered on post-
conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
... Jhe S~te's motion for summary disposition is granted in part and denied in part. 
The Petitioner has raised an issue of material fact with respect to the following claims set 
forth in the Amended Petition for Post Conviction relief: claims f, 1, p, r, and s. The 
remaining claims are summarily dismissed. 
ORDER 
The State's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby GRANTED in part, and 
DENIED in part, based upon the foregoing opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this t°]ft.day of November 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, II, 
Petitioner, 
v. 












CASE NO. CV 2013-0763 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner's 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Review. The Petitioner was represented by 
Gregory Hurn, of the firm Kwate Law Offices. The State was represented by Nance 
Ceccarelli, Nez Perce County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. The parties were before the 
Court on May 1, 2014. The Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its 
decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 17, 2010, a jury found Gary Mallory guilty of Murder in the First 
Degree, LC. §18-4001, 18-4002, and 18-4003, and Domestic Battery, LC.§ 18-918(2)(a) 
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and 18-903(a).1 On June 3, 2010, the Court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-eight 
(28) years to life for Murder in the First Degree~ and two (2) years for Domestic Battery, 
to run consecutively. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the Petitioner's 
conviction on January 3, 2012. The Idaho Supreme Court denied Petition for Review on 
May 22, 2012. A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was timely filed on April 12, 2013. 
The State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on May 16, 2013. The matter 
was submitted on the record in open court on September 19, 2013. At that time, the 
parties submitted the matter to the Court, the Honorable Carl Kerrick presiding, for 
review of the State's motion and the Amended Petition presented by the Petitioner.2 
Judge Kerrick entered an Opinion and Order on Motion for Summary Disposition 
on November 7, 2013. Summary disposition was granted in part and denied in part; the 
Court determined that the Petitioner established material issues of fact with respect to 
five issues. These claims are: first, whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel by not reviewing private investigator Shrader's report with the Petitioner so 
that he could assist in his own defense; second, whether counsel was ineffective by not 
fully litigating and presenting to the district court evidence of statements made by the 
Petitioner during police interrogation, in support of the Petitioner's motion to suppress 
evidence; third, whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose on the record 
a potential conflict of interest where witness Amber Taylor may have been related to trial 
counsel's wife; fourth, whether counsel was ineffective when Petitioner's right to speedy 
trial was waived without his consent; and fifth, whether the prosecuting attorney 
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the underlying crimmal matter, Nez Perce County Case CR-2009--0172. 
2 Judge Kerrick presided over the criminal trial and later the post-conviction case until his retirement. 
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committed misconduct in relation to a video-taped interview of the Petitioner by law 
enforcement. 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a 
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution 
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented 
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice; · 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is 
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
( 6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho 
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack 
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common 
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
LC. § 19-490l(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from 
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." LC. § 19-
4902(a) 
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the 
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v_ State, 127 Idaho 709, 
711, 905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief 
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285, 
287,912 P.2d 653, 655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that 
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requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction 
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the petition. LC. § 19-4903." Id. 
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and 
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim 
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,846,875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). 
Under I.C. § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief 
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, 
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If 
the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711, 
905 P .2d at 644. "It is also the rule that ~ conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any 
fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Gary Mallory testified regarding the five claims from the Amended Petition that 
remained following the Court's order?n the State's motion for summary 
disposition. First Mallory testified that trial counsel hired a private investigator, 
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Paul Schrader, to aid with trial preparation. Shrader prepared a report for counsel, 
but Mallory did not review the report with his attorney before trial. 
2. Mallory testified that there were statements in the Shrader report which he could 
refute or might aid in his defense. Mallory was not aware of a statement made by 
Deborah Shelman that Shelman did not see Mallory at the bar on February 13, 
2009, which was the not consistent with other witness testimony. Mallory 
disagreed with a statement by Kathy Owens that she had only spoke to him once, 
but Mallory testified he spoke with her three times. Finally, Mallory testified that 
people could have been contacted to dispute statements that Amber Taylor made 
within the report. 
3. Mallory testified regarding his interrogation by the Lewiston Police Department 
the morning after his wife's death. Mallory testified he told law enforcement at 
least six times that he wanted a lawyer. Mallory told trial counsel, Neil Cox, that 
he told law enforcement he wanted an attorney. Mallory testified that he wanted 
to see the video of the interrogation before he signed an affidavit that was 
presented to the Court at a motion to suppress hearing, but that counsel would not 
let him review the video. 
4. Mallory testified that at trial there were pictures presented which showed injuries 
on his back. These injuries were not visible in the video of the police 
interrogation. Mallory testified that he explained to Cox that the pictures were 
taken at the hospital after the interrogation. Mallory believed that Cox could have 
__ _ __ !~fut~ci_~s~e>ny_r~g<lf~g ~e mar~s_l~nd that this infopn_ation woulci have _b~en 
useful for his defense. 
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5. During the criminal proceedings Mallory signed a waiver of speedy trial. Mallory 
testified he never discussed the implications of signing a waiver with the public 
defender first assigned to his case, Robert Van Idour. Mallory also did not 
discuss the waiver of speedy counsel with Neil Cox, the second attorney assigned 
to represent him. 
6. The criminal case was originally assigned to public defender Robert Van Idour. 
Van Idour was assisted in the defense by attorney Joanna McFarland. Before the 
matter went to trial, Mallory made a motion on his own behalf seeking alternate 
counsel. The Court granted the Motion and attorney Neil Cox was assigned to the 
case. Cox was assisted by attorney Thomas Clark. Mallory also made a motion 
requesting new attorney at the first day of his trial because he was dissatisfied 
with Cox's representation. After colloquy with the Court, Mallory's motion was 
denied. Mallory testified that his relationship with Cox was volatile at best. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There are five claims before this Court at the evidentiary hearing, four claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
In order to survive summary dismissal, the Petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that a material issue of facts exists as to two issues: whether the counsel's 
performance was deficient, and whether the deficiency prejudiced the Petitioner's case. 3 
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to survive summary dismissal, the 
petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether-cowiseiis i,erfon:nance-was deficient; and-(2) a material 1ssue of 
3 The three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which will be considered in an evidentiary hearing 
are set forth in the Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief as claims ±: 1, p, and r. 
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· fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case. 
·Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064--
65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984);Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 
177 P .3d 362, 367 (2008). To establish deficient assistance, the claimant 
has the burden of showing that her attorney's conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d 
at 367. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the 
claimant's counsel was competent and diligent. Id. More simply put, ''the 
standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms." State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 
306,986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). Additionally, to establish prejudice, the 
claimant must show a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's 
deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177 P.3d at 367. 
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624-625, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271-1272 (2010). Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are judged under the standards set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984). 
An accused has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 
(1963). The right to counsel necessarily includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 
S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, n. 14 (1970); Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801,806,839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992). The.right to 
effective assistance of counsel extends to the defendant's first appeal as a 
matter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396, 105 S.Ct. 830,836, 83 
L.Ed.2d 821,829 (1985). 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Each ineffective assistance of counsel claim will be addressed separately. 
a. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not 
reviewing private investigator Shrader's report with the Petitioner so 
that he could assist in his own defense 
Mallory asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not review 
Shrader' s report with Mallory so that Mallory could assist with his own defense. Mallory 
was not aware of a statement made by Deborah Shelman that Shelman. did not see 
Mallory at the bar on February 13, 2009, which was the not consistent with other witness 
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testimony. Mallory disagreed with a statement by Kathy Owens that she had only spoke 
to him once, but Mallory testified he spoke with her three times. Finally, Mallory 
testified that people could have been contacted to dispute statements that Amber Taylor 
made within the report. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the alleged failure to review the investigator's 
report with Mallory amounted to deficient performance of counsel4 under the first part of 
the Strickland test, Mallory has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from this 
conduct, which is required by the second part of the Strickland test. Mallory has not 
provided a copy of the report to the Court for review, and further, he has not shown that 
even if the statements of concern were refuted, that this would have changed the outcome 
of his trial. Therefore, Mallory has not met his burden of showing prejudice on this issue. 
The State's motion for summary disposition is granted on this claim. 
b. Whether counsel was ineffective by not fully litigating and presenting to 
the district court evidence of statements made by the Petitioner during 
police interrogation, in support of the Petitioner's motion to suppress 
evidence 
Mallory asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully litigate and present 
evidence of statements made by the Petitioner during police interrogation. Mallory 
provided portions of the trial transcript from the motion to suppress hearing. See 
Defendant's Exhibit F. The transcript and motions filed in CR-2009-0172 establish that 
4 The State did not offer the testimony of trial counsel, thus, there was no testimony regarding whether or 
not counsel reviewed the report in question, whether or not counsel discussed the report with Mallory, or 
whether trial counsel made strategic or tactical decisions regarding the information in the report. The 
burden is on the petitioners to show that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and the standard embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was 
competent and diligent. See Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 362, 367 (2008). In the case at 
hand, because counsel did not testify regarding his strategic or tactical decisions, there is no evidence in the 
record before this Court which supports the State's argument that trial counsel's decisions regarding the use 
and review of the report were strategic or tactical decisions. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
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trial counsel was acting within the bounds of objective reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms. State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999). 
Counsel presented the video to the Court for review and argued that statements made by 
Mallory should be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Mallory 
has not met his burden of showing that trial counsel's performance was deficient on this 
issue.5 Therefore, the State's motion to summarily dismiss this claim is granted. 
c. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose on the record 
a potential conflict of interest where witness Amber Taylor may have 
been related to trial counsel's wife 
Mallory asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose on the record that 
he might have had a potential conflict of interest because one of the witnesses at trial 
might have been related to trial counsel's wife. Mallory has provided no evidence to the 
Court to establish there is a relationship between witness Amber Taylor and trial counsel. 
The burden is on the petitioner to provide facts which would establish his claim. On this 
issue, the Petitioner has failed to provide evidence that there was a relationship between 
these two people which would have created a conflict of interest Further, the Petitioner 
has provided no evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective and that the outcome 
5 In addition, Mallory appears to assert that the trial court erred when the motion to suppress was denied in 
pretrial motions. An application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. I. C. § 19-
4901 (b ). ,· ''''.' . . ,,•··: ... :·,····-·. 
Generally speaking, a claim or ~~~ which was or could have been ~@: on iPi>~) may 
not ?e considered _in ~ost-convic~~E:J?~-~.S~,e~~s. J~ ~:fter ~~,~H1ination of the substance of 
Whitehawk's application and the JS~p~ rA~,¢1:1, m his direct ~pp~J, we conclude that_ 110 
reversible error occurred in respe~:t!9,.t:\1e dismissal of all but two of the grounds r~i.§~4 in the 
application. Among the grounds t~~~~ by Whitehawk in his application were allegations that 
his plea agreement was iIJ,v~~d and that __ :t:he court erred in considerin,g,certain evidence for 
sentencing. These same iijri~ were ~~Js~a in Whitehawk's direct ~pp~i and have been 
addressed by this Court in Whitehawk L A convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the 
same factual questions in his application, in virtually the same factual context already presented 
in a direct~ppeal. Parsons V. State, 113 Idaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Ct.App.1987); State V. 
Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct.App.1985). 
Whitehawkv. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-833, 780 P.2d 153, 154-155 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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of the trial would have bee~ different but for the deficient performance. Because the 
Petitioner has failed to meet his burden on this claim, the State's motion for summary 
disposition is granted. 
d. Whether counsel was ineffective when Petitioner's right to speedy trial 
was waived without his consent. 
Mallory asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because Mallory's right to 
speedy trial was waived without his consent. An alleged violatior1 of the right to speedy 
trial is discussed in State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Our Supreme Court has indicated that when an alleged violation of 
the right to speedy trial is in issue, we should look first to determine if the 
statute, I.C. § 19-3501, has been abridged. State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 
579 P .2d 697 (1978). If the statute is applicable and there is no "good 
cause" for the delay or the trial was not postponed at the defendant's 
request, then the charge against the accused must be dismissed and the 
inquiry is at an end. However, ifI.C. § 19-3501 is not implicated, then we 
should next determine whether the constitutional provisions-both state 
and federal-relating to speedy trial have been violated. State v. Russell, 
108 Idaho 58,696 P.2d 909 (1985). 
Id. at 842, 718 P.2d at 1280. In the case at hand, Mallory signed an affidavit which 
waived his right to speedy trial. Further, there is evidence that Mallory contributed to the 
need for the waiver of speedy trial in this case. Mallory requested, and was granted, a 
substitution of counsel. Mallory testified at the evidentiary hearing that his relationship 
with attorney Cox was volatile at best. "The period of delay attributable to the defendant 
will not be weighed against the state." State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 838, 118 P.3d 160, 
170 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Mallory has failed to meet his burden to establish that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to advise him regarding his rights to speedy trial. In addition, 
Mallory fails to show that even if counsel were deficient, how this deficiency would have 
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changed the outcome of his trial. Thus, the State's motion to summarily dismiss this 
claim is granted. 
2. Prosecutorial misconduct claim-whether the prosecuting attorney 
committed misconduct in relation to a video-taped interview of the Petitioner 
by law enforcement. 
Within the Amended Petition, Mallory asserted that the prosecuting attorney 
committed misconduct in relation to a video-taped interview of Mallory by law 
enforcement. Mallory has not provided any evidence to the Court with respect to this 
claim. In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and 
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim 
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). Toe 
Petitioner has not met his burden on this issue, therefore the State's motion for summary 
dismissal of this claim is granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner raised issues of material fact with respect to five claims set forth in 
the amended petition for post-conviction relief. An evidentiary hearing was held, 
allowing the Petitioner to present evidence in support of his claims. Based upon the 
foregoing analysis, the petitioner failed to present a preponderance of evidence in support 
of his claims. Therefore, the State's motion for summary disposition is granted. 
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The State's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this l 0,-,.,day of June 201~. 
c 
JAYP. G 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND Ol}DER was mailed, postage prepaid, by the 
undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this /(Jr>'t day of June, 2014, on: 
Gregory Hurn 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Nance Ceccarelli 
PO Box 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Gary W. Mallory II #97013 
ICI-0 Cl-AB 
3 81 West Hospital Dr 
Orofino ID 83544 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK 
By(i]J(l0~ 
Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, II, 
Petitioner, 
V. 












CASE NO. CV 2013-0763 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE COURT that all claims 
contained within the Petition for Post-Conviction relief are hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED this /()-p-. day of June 2014. 





CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was: 
L hand delivered via court basket, or 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this{fJP.,day of 
June, 2014, to: 
Gregory Hurn 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Nance Ceccarelli 
P OBox 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Gary W. Mallory II #97013 
ICI-0 Cl-Al3 
381 West Hospital Dr 
Orofino ID 83544 
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Gregory R. Hurn 
K wate Law Offices, PLLC 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-7060 
Fax: (208) 746-2660 
Idaho State Bar# 8753 
Attorney for Petitioner/ Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, II, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 











Case No. CV 2013-00763 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, 
NANCE CECCARELLI, POST OFFICE BOX 1267, LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501, AND 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL , POST OFFICE BOX 83720, 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Petitioner/Appellant, GARY W. MALLORY, II, appeals against 
the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment, entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 10th day of June, 2014, Honorable Judge Jay P. Gaskill presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ORIGINAL 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 l(c)(l-10). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue which the appellant may assert on appeal; 
provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues 
on appeal. 
a. Did the district court err in failing to grant appellant's Amended Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief? 
4. a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the standard transcript. 
5: The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28(b)(2), I.A.R.: The transcript of the 
Evidentiary hearing dated the pt day of May, 2014, Nez Perce County Case No. CV 2013-0763. 
6. I certify: 
a. That a copy ofthis notice of appeal has been served on the court reporter. 
b. That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fees because 
appellant is indigent, without funds, and the undersigned counsel has been appointed to represent 
the defendant on the appeal. 
c. That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the record because appellant is indigent, without funds, and the undersigned counsel has been 
appointed to represent the Petitioner on the appeal. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
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d. That appellant is exempt from paying the appellant filing fee because 
appellant is indigent, without funds, and the undersigned counsel has been appointed to represent 
the-Petitioner of the appeal. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 and the Attorney General of the State ofldaho pursuant to Idaho Code§ 671401(1). 
DATED this/D ft.. day of July, 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
By L>'(J?r RdJ~ 
Gregory R. Hum 
3 
213
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 




X:.. Hand Delivered 
Overnight mail 
to the following: 
Lawrence G. Wasden (Mt1;~ 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83 720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720 
Nance Ceccarilli 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
3050 N Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Nez Perce County Court Reporter 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
Post Office Box 896 Boise, Idaho 83703 ( ,nc,,'tu) 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By $'U{J ? b 
Gregory R. Hum 
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Gregory R. Hum 
K wate Law Offices, PLLC 
1502 G Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-7060 
Fax: (208) 746-2660 
Idaho State Bar# 8753 
Attorney For Petitoner/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE CIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'T'TT'-""'UNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, II, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 












Case No. CV 2013-00763 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND TO 
APPOINT STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
COMES NOW, Gregory R. Hum of Kwate Law Offices, PLLC, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
19-870 (l)(b), and hereby moves the court for an order appointing the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office to represent the Petitioner/Appellant in all further appellate proceedings and 
allowing K wate Law Offices, PLLC to withdraw as counsel of record. This motion is brought on 
the grounds and for the reasons that the Petitioner/ Appellant is currently being represented by the 
office of the Public Defender, Nez Perce County; the State Appellate Public Defender's Office is 
required by statute to represent the Petitioner/ Appellant in all felony appellate proceedings; and it 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND 
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is in the interest of justice, for them to do so in this case since the Petitioner/ Appellant is indigent, 
and any further proceedings on this case will be appeals. 
DATED this JD 'fl-day of July, 2014. 
... ----------------------· 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND 
TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 




_____b_ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight mail 
to the following: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Lawrence G. Wasden (Mettk.,t) 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND 
TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
3050 N Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 (~-I~ 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
KW ATE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By ~i2c8 
Gregory R. Hurn 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY W. MALLORY, II 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 












Case No. CV 2013-00763 
ORDER ALLOWING WITHDRAW AL 
OF ATTORNEY AND APPOINTING 
STATE APPELLANT PUBLIC 
DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
The attorney for the Petitioner/ Appellant having moved the court for an order allowing him 
to withdraw from his representation of the Petitioner/ Appellant in said matter, and good cause 
appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Gregory R. Hurn of Kwate Law Offices, PLLC, and 
hereby is, allowed to withdraw as the attorney for the Petitioner/Appellant in said matter. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Idaho State Public Defender's Office is 
hereby ordered to represent the Petitioner/Appellant in any proceedings for appeal in said matter. 
DATED this~?- dayof __ (;-~....._,,..../-~,2014. 
ORDER ALLOWING WITHDRAW AL 
OF ATTORNEY AND APPOINTING 
STA TE APPELLANT PUBLIC 
DEFENDER'S OFFICE 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J. )-aay of ~ 
and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
, 2014, I caused a true 
K wate Law Offices, PLLC 
1502 G Street 
Idaho State Appellant Public Defender's Office 
3050 N Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Lewiston, Idaho 83401 
(Court Basket) 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(Court Basket) 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Patty 0. Weeks, 
ORDERALLOWINGWITHDRAWAL 
OF ATTORNEY AND APPOINTING 
STATE APPELLANT PUBLIC 
DEFENDER'S OFFICE 




SARA 8. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5867 II~ RUG 21 fft 1 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
l.S.B. #6247 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
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CASE NO. CV 2013-763 
S.C. DOCKET NO. 42340 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE· 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS; DANIEL L. SPICKLER, NEZ PERCE COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR, P.O. BOX 1267, LEWISTON, ID, 83501, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY .GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above~named appellant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 10th day of June, 2014, the Honorable Jay Gaskill, 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above · are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a), I.AR. 





2083342985 ~. I , /~lp:13:50 08-21-2014 ; - • I 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, is/are: 
(a) Did the district court err in failing to grant Appellant's Amended 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief? 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record 
that is sealed is the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). 
5; · Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.AR. 25(c). The appellant 
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) Summary Disposition Hearing held September 19, 2013 (Court 
Reporter: Nancy Towler, estimation of less than 100 pages); and 
(b) Evidentiary Hearing held May 1, 2014 (Court Reporter: Nancy 
Towler, no estimation of pages listed on Register of Actions). 
6. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record 
pursuant to I.A.R. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to 
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under 
I.A.R. 28(b)(2): 
(a) Any exhibits, affidavits, objections, responses, · briefs or 
memorandums. including all attachments or copies of transcripts, filed or 
lodged, by the state, the appellate, or the court in support of, or in 
opposition to, the dismissal of the Post-Conviction Petition. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
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7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the Court Reporter, Nancy Towler; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho 
Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, Idaho Code§ 19-4904, I.AR. 24(4)); 
(c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a post 
conviction case (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 
23(a)(10)); 
(d) That arrangements have been made with Nez Perce County who 
will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the 
client is indigent, I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(h); 
(e) That seivice has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to l.AR.20. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2014 . 
. ~~  
Chief, Appellate Unit 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of August, 2014, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
GREGORY HURN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1502 G ST 




LEWISTON ID 83501. 
DANIELL SPICKLER 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
PO BOX 1267 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
ERUtmf 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF·. THK SECOND, JUDH:;IAL DJ STRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR·THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
GARY WAYNE MALLORY II, 
Petitioner~Appellant, 













SUPREME COURT NO. 42340-2014 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Patty O; Weeks, Clerk of the District Court.of.the Second 
Judicial District of the State bf Idaho, in and for .Ne:1;:· Perce 
County, do hereby certify that the following list is a list of 
the exhibits offered or admitted and which have! been lodged with 
the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the Court this ~~~~--~ day of October 2014; 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
~.--,:~ 
Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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Gary Wayne Mallory II, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant .. 
· Sorted by E~<:hibit Number 
Description 
Defendant's exhibit A 
copy of photo (State's exhibit 2-A) 
admitted at jury trial jn CR09-1472 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 5-1-14 
Defendant's exhibit B 
copy of photo (State's exhibit 2-8) 
admitted at jury trial in CR09-1472 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 5,;.1-14 
Defendant's exhibit C 








On Appeal fo Deanna 8/ .. 
Assigned to: Kwate Law _Office po· ~013, 
Admitted On Appeal to De~nna 8/ 
Assigned to: .. Kwate .Law Office PD 2013, 
. . 
Admitted . On Appeal to Deanna 8/ 
admitted at j!Jry trial in_CR09-1472 ... · · ·. ·. .. · ··· . 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY: ·.: .' .. ' ._. ~ssigned to. ·:Kwate. L.:aw.Ofl'ice PD2013;.: _· .. · .. 
;• ' . ..: . ·: : . ·· . ..:, .:·:\ ;:· \: ... ·. ~ :- . ': . 
HEARING 5-1-14 . . . . . ·· ·· 
Defendant's exhibit D . 
copy of photo (State's ~xhibit 2-D) 
Admitted On Appeal to Deanna _8/ 
admitted at jury trial in CR09-1472 · · · · · · · · · 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY ·. . ·. , Assigned to; . Kwat~ law Office PD 2013; : 
HEARING 5-1-f4 
Defendant's .exhibit E · . 
copy of photo (State's exhibit 2-E) 
admitted-at jury trial in"CR09-:1_.472· .. 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 5-1-14 · . . .. 
Defendant's ·exhibit F . . · . 
copy of pages 80-83 and 108-110 
transcript pretrial motion hearing 
3-4-10 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 5-1-14 
**************COURT TOO!( 
JUDICIAL NOTICE Of .STATE'S 
EXHIBIT #15 ADMITTED AT 
JURY TRIAL IN cr09-1472 ON 
3-10-10-CD DEFE.NDANT'S 
INTERVIEW . 
·. A(:lmitted On.Appe.aJ tctPeahna.8L ·. '.. .. '. .. ,, . ' ~ ... 
Assigned fo: Kwate Law Offjce:pp 2013, .- • 
. . ., . . . ·~ ~ . i' ... , . 
Admitted On Appeal to Dean_na 8/ . 
. Assigned to: . Kwate Law Office PD 2013, 
Offered . On App~al to Deanna 8/. 
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CLERK.1 S. C_ERT1FICATE 
I, Patty O. _Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of. the State of Idaho,. in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, . do hereby :de:r:tif'y that the forego.:ihg \:ierk• s~ ·Record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled and.bound by me and 
contains true .and correct copies of all pleadings; documents, and 
papers designated to be included unq.er ~ule 28, . Ida,ho Appellate 
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of CroE!s.,-Appeal, and 
additional .documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That no exhibits were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of; this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my 'hand and_ affixed 




. . ' 
.day'of October. 2014. 
PATTY'.Q,. WEEKS, Clerk 
_,_. < • ' 
··By ~--~·/ 
· !; Deputy Clerk 
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